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THE HIGHER HISTORY.

What Is History? Five lectures on the Modern Science of History. By Karl Lamprecht, Ph.D., LL.D., Professor of History in the University of Leipzig. Translated from the German by E. A. Andrews. New York: The Macmillan Co.

In 1904, Professor Lamprecht, in response to an invitation to address the Congress of Arts and Sciences at St. Louis, prepared the first of these lectures; and a similar invitation to participate in the celebration of the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the founding of Columbia University led to the preparation of the other four. In the same year the five lectures were published in Germany under the title *Moderne Geschichtswissenschaft*, and now have found their way again into this country through the medium of an English translation.

In these addresses we have an epitome of Professor Lamprecht's views of history, already well known to readers of the prefaces of the second edition of his *Deutsche Geschichte*, and to those who have followed the controversy between Professor Lamprecht and his opponents that has waged since 1894. The present volume contains little that is new, and, except for the occasional references to American conditions, repeats in more compact and less controversial form the arguments of the *Alte und neue Richtungen* (1896), and the *Was ist Kulturgeschichte* (1896-1897). In fact, so condensed is the form of statement, so unfamiliar to the general reader are the larger number of psychological terms employed, and so awkward and often ungrammatical is the translation that the lectures, we fear, will appeal to but few besides specialists in psychology and the philosophy of history. This fact is much to be regretted for the reason that the entire work is in the highest degree suggestive and deserving of consideration by every one to whom history is something more than biography on one side or description on the other. As studies in historical synthesis, Lamprecht's essays are of the utmost importance, for although the principles enunciated have been derived from a study of German history only, they are probably universal in character.

Briefly stated Professor Lamprecht's fundamental idea is as follows: Synthetic history, which must be sharply distinguished from historical scholarship and method, is primarily a socio-psychological science, dealing less with individuals than with social groups, and having as its dominant interest the psychical state of each social group or collective community during the different periods or culture-epochs of its development. These socio-psychic conditions, which are only discoverable by means of thorough and scientific processes of historical research and criticism, have grown steadily in intensity and complexity from primitive times, when language and religion were the leading outward manifestations, to the present day, when law, the State, and the nation represent their highest development.

Having stated this general view in the opening lecture, Professor Lamprecht presents in rapid outline the different culture-epochs in the history of the German nation as he has worked them out in his own history. These epochs, classified according to their psychic characteristics, are the age of symbolism (to about 300 A. D.), the age of typism or of conformity to certain types (early feudal period to 1050), the age of conventionalism (late feudal period to 1555), the age of individualism (Reformation, Renaissance, and *Aufklärung*, 1555 to 1750), and the two ages of subjectivism (1750 to 1870, 1870 to the present time). This development in psychic life corresponds to certain aspects of material change: such as the transition from nomadic to settled life, the exchange and barter of natural products (*Naturalwirthschaft*), the entrance in of money and capital (*Geldwirthschaft*), and finally the feverish economic conditions of to-day—each change representing an increasing intensity in the socio-psychic life of the nation.

Having reached this point, Professor Lamprecht in his third lecture presents a striking picture of the economic, political and social phenomena characterizing the transition to present-day conditions, but in his fourth lecture returns to his general theme, and analyzes the psychological phenomena common to all the epochs with a view to discovering certain universal laws which will warrant the statement that

he great human communities have passed hrough similar culture-epochs. In his inal lecture he considers the influence of ne people on another, and attacks the doc- rines of the materialistic school which he naintains are based on the impossible con- eption of an isolated nation.

No brief statement will do justice to Pro- fessor Lamprecht's arguments. They will be helpful not only to the historical writer and teacher, but to the student of present-day conditions as well. They teach that every historical event is to be judged according to the highest universal-historical categories, that the history of individual nations is to be valued not according to the canons of economic, political, and social history, but according to the standards of the best intellectual attainments, and that cultural ages in national or world history must be defined, less by the character of the economic and political activities than by the noblest psychic attainments in music, poetry, and plastic art. Only when the importance to world history of each individual or nation has been estimated in a socio-psychic sense can a scientific *Weltgeschichte* be written. We may not agree with all that is here stated, but we must concede that a theory of history, which takes into account all of man's activities as a social being, and does not limit itself to political phenomena and the organization of the State, is worthy of our highest respect and consideration.

WHAT IS HISTORY?

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WHAT IS HISTORY?

FIVE LECTURES ON THE MODERN SCIENCE OF HISTORY

BY

KARL LAMPRECHT, PH.D., LL.D.
PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN

BY

E. A. ANDREWS

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To

MY FRIENDS OF THE YEARS SPENT
ON THE RHINE

In Faithful Memory

PREFACE

THE following addresses were published in Freiburg, Germany, during the autumn of 1904, under the title, "Moderne Geschichtswissenschaft." The English translation is the work of E. A. Andrews, who secured the aid of Dr. Felix Krüger of the department of philosophy of the University of Leipzig in the matter of psychological terms; Dr. Max Lisner also lent valuable aid. Professor William E. Dodd, of Randolph-Macon College, Virginia, gave the whole a careful revision. To all of these both the author and the translator take this means of expressing their hearty thanks.

Like everything else in this world, this little book has its *raison d'être* and its special occasion. As to the former, the author felt that in his work on the "History of Germany" he had carried his investigations far enough into the different culture-epochs to justify him in formulating and presenting to the public his ideas as to the content of history and the true

method of writing it. The immediate occasion came in the form of an invitation to take active part in the Congress of Arts and Sciences which met in St. Louis during the World's Fair. There the first lecture was delivered. Being called on also to deliver some addresses on the occasion of the celebration of the hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the founding of Columbia University, New York, in October of the same year, it seemed proper to follow up there the same line of thought. In this way originated the last four chapters of the book. Another incentive was given in the literature of recent psychological science, particularly in von Lipps' "Outlines of Psychology," — a book which seemed to invite a further application of the laws of psychology to the science of history.

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LECTURE I

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT CHARACTER OF THE SCIENCE OF HISTORY

WHAT IS HISTORY?

LECTURE I

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT CHARACTER OF THE SCIENCE OF HISTORY

HISTORY is primarily a socio-psychological science. In the conflict between the old and the new tendencies in historical investigation, the main question has to do with social-psychic, as compared and contrasted with individual-psychic factors; or, to speak somewhat generally, the understanding on the one hand of conditions, on the other, of heroes, as the motive powers in the course of history. Hence, the new, progressive and therefore aggressive point of view in this struggle is the socio-psychological, and for that reason it may be termed modern. The individual point of view is, on the other hand, the older, one that is based on the championship of

a long-contested, but now, by means of countless historical works, a well-established position.

What is, then, the cause of these differences? Personal preference, or the special endowments of individual investigators? The reaction of feeling against former exaggerations of the one or the other principle? Assimilation to other trends of thought, philosophic or scientific, of the science of history? Nothing of the kind. Rather, we are at the turn of the stream, the parting of the ways in historical science.

In order to understand better the process that is going on let us consider the following contrasts of the day.

Take first, a period in which all men, within a relatively small community, such as we see in the beginnings of a nation, are absolutely of the same psychic equality, so much so that they in action and feeling can be said to stand side by side as examples of the same endowments. Then take another age in which, within a given community of much greater extent, each individual differs in kind from all others, so that — even more than is at present the case — his

volitions and sensations differ radically from those of his fellow-men.

It is clear, then, that we have here the two poles of human activity whose influences must give different results in any study of the currents of life that we call historical psychic existence, the life embraced within the limits of these poles. In the first case the treatment would yield only a delineation of the life of units; for the treatment of the collective psychic existence would produce as a result only a sum of the already known, — the psychic existence of the individual. In the second case we should indeed take a glance first at the psychic life of the unit from which it would be seen that it by no means included the character of the life of the many, but rather that the collective psychic life fertilized by the marked deviations of the individual within itself is quite a thing in itself, with its peculiar psychic or socio-psychic character; and that to this spiritual life of the whole, the psychic activity of the individual is in such a manner subordinate as to be dominated by it for the best and highest ends.

One sees, therefore, that the first case of the

coexistence of persons psychically quite identical would result in a purely individual psychology; the second case of coexistence of absolutely differentiated persons would result in a radically socio-psychological historical method of treatment.

But the instances just given never occur in perfection. However, the connections formed among them constitute principles in the course of history and historical science; the pole of similarly organized persons appears in the beginning of cultural development as the principle of lower culture, while the pole of dissimilar units reveals itself as underlying higher cultures, for the simple reason that the trend of evolution is toward progressive differentiation and integration of the human soul.

If on the results of the examples cited and deduced in a purely psychological manner are based the main principles of every development of historical treatment from the lowest to the highest, one finds corresponding to them, in the various civilizations of the world, the same course of history, descriptive or scientific. It begins always with the individual-psychological

investigation of the past, and arrives finally at a markedly social-psychological point of view. In a word it is the course of events which begins with the heroic poem and ends with the history of civilization. If we paint the panorama of this historiographic development rather more vividly and minutely, it will be seen that the individuals of the lower stages of civilization have as little consciousness of the conditions that are characteristic of them, as of the difference between these conditions and those of other stages of civilization. The English, French, Italian, and, in particular, the German poet of the Golden Age of Mediævalism who worked over the materials of classic antiquity transferred them unconsciously to the conditions of his own age. Æneas became a knight, and Dido a fair châtelaine. It was only the beginning of modern times, the closing centuries of dying mediævalism, that brought the dawn of a comprehension of the differences of various cultural conditions, and therefore in our opinion a quickened sense of the historical difference of the periods of civilization in general. Similar observations might be made in the history of

ancient peoples and in the cultural phases of eastern Asia. Everywhere the beginnings of socio-psychological historical comprehension are coincident with the emancipation of individuality from mediæval restraint in order to enter on the so-called new age with the more rapid process of its own differentiation.

But before this stage is reached centuries have elapsed, and centuries in which history was understood only in the individual-psychologic sense, merely as the product of single distinguished individuals. And correspondingly the forms of historical tradition are purely individual. Almost everywhere there appear two forms which may be taken as typical, — genealogy and the heroic poem.

A characteristic beginning! Whence arises its dual nature? In both instances we are concerned with the memory of single persons, particularly of ancestors. But in the one case the barren record is taken from the purely prosaic reality of a natural pedigree, in the other the single individual is selected and his deeds immortalized in poetic form with an exaggerated objectivity. How does this difference arise?

We are here face to face with a radical division in the historical point of view, one which occurs in all ages in higher as in lower stages of culture. It can be characterized as the difference between Naturalism and Idealism. In the first instance reality is followed closely, held fast, copied. To this belong the rapid offhand sketches, the journalism of to-day in so far as it serves as the annalistic medium of news; and, finally, statistics. In the other case there intervenes between the simultaneous photographic and phonographic impression of occurrences and their collective reproduction, time, and with time, memory. Memory, with its thousand strange associations, abbreviating, rounding off, and admitting of outer influences and inner prejudices; in a word, memory is the artist that individualizes and remodels its subject. For what else is idealism but the retrospective treatment of a theme into which the personal note enters, — indeed with intention, — whereby the flood-gates are opened to the whole intellectual current of personality proper? Hence in higher states of culture, in the case of differentiated individuals, the personal style arises and with it the personal work

of art; while in lower states of culture, with individuals of similar proportions, and from the simultaneous work of the many, the impersonal, the typical timestyle will arise, and with it the art work of this particular style.

This explains, then, for the beginnings of historical tradition the growth of naturalistic and realistic forms side by side. As a naturalistic form there appears by preference the genealogy; as idealistic, the heroic poem. And with this the roots of the contention of ages are laid bare as to whether a historical work is a work of art or not. It will always be a work of art in so far as, even in naturalistic transmission, at least in higher cultural stages, the influence of personal elements cannot be avoided. And it will be peculiarly a work of art as soon as, in the case of an important theme, the imagination can bring forth a composition by means of idealizing retrospection. So that, when the *de lege ferenda* is uttered, one can only advise that to every historical work of our time, not only unconsciously but consciously, the character of a work of art should be given.

But genealogy and the epic are not the only forms of individual-psychic tradition. Together

with them and with increasing cultural growth and intellectual leisure, others come to the fore. If it be possible to follow the progress of human events not only through the forms of tradition, as required in genealogy and epic poetry, but more intensively, by means of the written letter, the chisel and the stilus, pedigrees and epics will be superseded — if, indeed, they do not disappear at once — by annals and chronicles. And even these forms can be improved upon. In the history of every human community, the inevitable moment comes in which reason, based on increasing experience, attempts independently to classify and control the world of phenomena, in which the logical conclusion begins gradually to yield to induction, and the miraculous to the causal principle; and if, with this, there begins a really scientific mastery of the outward world, then this too takes hold of historical tradition. And the direction it follows is both naturalistic and idealistic.

In the first instance tradition is ransacked for new sources; when found, these are brought to light in a clear-cut literary form. With untiring zeal the whole field is worked over,

and a careful consideration of isolated events is entered upon of which the object is to show each single occurrence to be indisputably genuine; it is then polished up, rubbed clear of its rusty casing, and presented to the world.

On the other hand, there is great need for the enormous accumulations of the classified and isolated traditional data produced by the unceasing mills of naturalistic criticism; these data must be turned to account as material for a more general positive structure of history with its divisions and emendations. Of course this is to be done under the direction of an authoritative and constructive mind, and not without the aid of the imagination. How else is a control of the enormous material possible? But the mere memorizing of details and a linking together of particulars, a handling such as was referred to, is clearly proved to be impossible. It is necessary that we employ some means of mechanical combination of the parts of the huge world of facts which knowledge alone can supply, certain forms of criticism to classify the mass of material and thereby control it. And naturally this constructive criti-

cism must deal in the first place with individuals who may still be considered as the only fundamental psychic motor powers of history. If their deeds, their single achievements, and the collective achievements of single persons, — if these can be regarded as parts of a completed series of facts in official service or in an independent profession, they must be grouped according to a system which does not overlook the universal course of things and which makes the whole only the more intelligible. This is the origin of Pragmatics.

But the *Divide et impera* embraced in the application of the pragmatic principle proves itself to be insufficient in the face of the mass of traditional material, continually increasing in scope as it does. Above those groups which Pragmatism has thus formed to facilitate the handling of events, above the whole survey of heroic deeds, incidents of wars or diplomatic negotiations, we see appearing by degrees the outlines of a better system of classification of material, a system which groups series of events of entire ages within the domain of whole nations and families of nations. As, for example,

the outlines of certain oft-recurring incidents in the history of the Papacy, or the types of similar occurrences in the development of the Prussian monarchy, or the main characteristics of religious movements in all respects alike and which are to be detected in the piety of all denominations of Protestantism. It is clearly possible to follow these also in the paths of formative criticism far beyond the simple domain of Pragmatism. The common landmarks, too, of historical happenings, especially when pragmatically grouped, can be massed together on the higher plane. With this accomplished, the work of the historian begins at the point where the development of the so-called historic theory of ideas sets in. The term "idea" arises from the application of the word to the historic elements common to these masses, so that the idea asserts itself as a form of higher thought integration. And in western culture, as far as investigation permits of a time limit, it is in its purely historiographic beginnings to be first found in the historical works of the last half of the eighteenth century.[1]

[1] Cf., of recent date, Heussi, "Church History and its Writing." Johan Lorenz von Mosheims. Gotha, 1904.

One naturally asks here, had these higher forms of integration from the beginning a closer connection with the naturalistic or idealistic conception of history? It is of interest to know that these comparatively abstract forms of intellectual activity had, for purely psychological reasons at first, the closest connection with idealistic historical description. Allied with this is the fact that this activity, having developed along quite primitive lines to a higher plane, was yet capable of assuming at times a transcendental character. The *ideas* which were made the basis of the understanding of the greatest historical concatenations by isolation and abstraction of the elements common to them, did not appear as human *ideas*, but were rather divine powers holding sway behind these events, permeating and determining them, as emanative and associative forms of the absolute working through the fates of men. It was a sort of idealistic historical treatment which slowly took shape in Germany in the course of the second half of the eighteenth century, which then, owing to Schelling, passed over into the great idealistic philosophy of German Romanticism, to which from the point of

view of the profoundest theory of life Ranke paid homage as long as he lived, and which, starting from all these points of its development, became a constituent part of all the higher historical training of the nineteenth century.

Meanwhile the strictly epistemological character of the theory of the *idea* had certainly been recognized, and not least clearly at the beginning of the great discussions of historical methods in the early nineties of the last century, and which have not yet entirely ceased. It can truly be said that to-day, practically no one believes in the transcendency of historical ideas, — that is, not fully, nor even in the Ranke sense, — but that, on the other hand, the usefulness of the conceptions contained in them for the grouping of the greater individual-psychic series of events is generally conceded.

While the individual-psychological treatment of history has been thus gradually developed to the state of perfection which marks it to-day, it had long had its limits, and — as far as the main principles of historical comprehension are concerned — its substitution in the form of a socio-psychological treatment had begun and had been proved to be necessary.

In the course of the latter part of the seventeenth, but more especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, all the peoples of western European culture passed through stages in which the most marked psychic differentiations took place in the individual members of these communities. A certain time-spirit dominated all these nations in which the civilization of the new American world had its origin; it is the spirit which may rightly be called that of Subjectivity. Not uniformity but variety of the subjective perfection of the individual is the ideal of to-day. And the collective culture of our time rests on vast working corporations of individuals who are no less vastly differentiated each in themselves.

For us it is a well-known state of affairs, this product of nervous activity which has characterized the last six or seven generations, and it is superfluous to describe it in detail. But it would not be inappropriate to trace once and for all, logically and clearly, the consequences of these changes as well for the character of historical science of the present as for that of the immediate future. The result is that for such a time as

this only that kind of historical comprehension is adequate which, side by side with the individual psychological, admits also the socio-psychological treatment, the consideration of the evolution of the collective psychic products of human communities—a treatment which does not merely allude occasionally to this admission, but maintains consistently and unconditionally, that for every case of historical investigation the socio-psychological forces are the stronger, and therefore those that properly determine the course of things; that, consequently, they include the operation of the individual-psychic forces. Granted that this is the universal formulation of the now necessary point of view as it is carried out to-day not only in the field of historiography (in some instances with a clear insight into its consequences), but as seen in the new sciences and new methods which it has made to bear fruit, *e.g.* sociology, or prehistoric excavations; yet it would be a mistake to assume that the revolution in this direction took place suddenly or that it has even now reached its completion. Rather has it gone forward slowly in the course of at least a century and a half, if we reckon

according to events in Germany. And the resulting views have been shown, though in steady conflict with the older individual-psychic opinions, to be invincible in spite of the marks of immaturity and a lack of definiteness borne on their face. They stand forth, nevertheless, with a breadth, a logical cohesion, and an inward completeness which it has been beyond the power of the bitterest hostility to weaken or to remove.

If I carry the study further to the contemplation of the evolution of Germany, because this is most familiar to me, and because, I believe, by keeping to a narrower limit, in the short time assigned to me, we may gain greater clearness and a more plastic form, I must not fail to mention the honored name of Herder, the hundredth anniversary of whose death has just been fittingly observed by Germans throughout the world. In the realm of Germanic cultures, and even beyond it, Herder stands as the creator of the conception "Folk soul" (the psyche of the masses). He was the first to admit the importance of the socio-psychic demands for the proper historical comprehension of the most important of all human communities, —

nations, — and to draw from these the necessary conclusions. But he did it,[1] not in a calm, entirely emotionless and intellectual spirit of research, but rather by leaps and with all the enthusiasm of the explorer. His was a psychic attitude toward the new-found inexhaustible material of the socio-psychic interrelations. But to reproach Herder on this score would betray an extremely small socio-psychic understanding. When communities have made rapid progress toward a higher spiritual existence, it is not in a rational manner or with purely intellectual age-marks of the thought process. Rather with youthful feelings of anticipation, with an ecstatic presentiment of dimly felt combinations, are the portals of a new epoch entered. Science becomes a prophecy, philosophy turns to poetical metaphysics. That was the character of the great German period of subjectivity that began with Klopstock, and ended in the spreading branches of the philosophy of identity — the period to which Herder, as one of its first great phenomena, belongs. Therefore Herder's enthusiastic grasp of the socio-psychic elements of

[1] See his "Ideas concerning the History of Mankind."

history does not stand alone. It is the property of the whole epoch and dominates the characteristic movement of the time — Romanticism. The advance step in all this was a clearer view of the vast combinations of the phenomena of the *mass-psyche* — an advance which brought one to describe vital points poetically, in part or wholly so. But there was not the clear comprehension of the constituent elements of the *mass-psychic* or even of the elementary disentangling of combined phenomena.

It has been reserved to the so-called history-of-civilization method to attempt the description of socio-psychic phenomena, and Freytag, Riehl, even Burckhardt, devoted themselves to this task. Since the last decade of the last century, however, this method has gradually grown out of date.

That no progress was made in historical method during a long period may be traced to the existence of too great a mass of material to deal with. To this another cause must be added. The first great subjective period which had begun with 1750 ended about 1820, at latest 1830; then about 1870 to 1880 another epoch begins, the second period of subjectiv-

ism. In the interval, however (since 1820, at latest), the conquests of the first period began to be not so much developed as intellectualized. Enthusiasm yielded to reflection, the anticipative comprehension of rationalism. It is the rebound in which, in the domain of natural science, the period of natural philosophy was replaced by the recent development of mechanics; the change by which, in the field of mental sciences, the old rationalism of the Aufklärung, as it had been developed in the generations following 1680, again became conspicuous, though with alterations. The outcome of this movement in the science of history, which had run aground in the impotent epigonism of art and poetry, as in the barren historicism of the mental sciences of the period of 1860 to 1870, was the reappearance of the individual-psychological method. But the socio-psychological point of view was not yet sufficiently well grounded to maintain its supremacy. In the competition of these rival influences, Ranke grew to be a master of his art. This coincidence, in a certain sense most fortunate, and at all events peculiar in its way, gives to him and his works

a position all their own. The individual-psychologic point of view now gains the ascendency more completely, though not so much because of Ranke as of his disciples, especially von Sybel. There was no longer any particular importance attached to the efforts of those who thought and worked according to the history-of-civilization method; these were not opposed because they were not considered as of more than passing significance. It was a time of almost purely political activity: the nation yearned with every fibre of its soul for the long-coveted political unity. Such works as the political history of the old German empire by Giesebrecht, or Droysen's "History of Prussian Polity," may be cited as important phenomena in this connection. Why should they not have preferred political history which, to a certain extent, was the individual-psychologic method, to all other forms of history? This explains for the most part the fact that the advance in the socio-psychological interpretation of events, made in the meantime by other peoples, *e.g.* the French in the philosophy of Comte, met with small acceptance in Germany.

But the last decades of the nineteenth century

brought the rebound. The years 1870 and 1871 released men from their great anxieties concerning the national life and unity; the development of internal culture comes prominently now to the front. And that happened at the very dawn of a new period of modern psychic existence. The rise of political economy and technology, the rapid development of freedom of trade all over the globe, the victories of science in the realm of nature, even to penetrating into the confines of the inner life: all this and a host of other less important phenomena yielded an untold amount of new stimuli and possibilities of association, and with that an unheard-of extension of psychic activity as then existing. But of this more in another lecture. The result was a marked differentiation of intellectual activity, and with it the renewed and determining advance of the socio-psychic elements. This was evident along the whole line of scientific endeavor, especially in the rise of sociology and anthropology during the last decades, with their far-reaching consequences and accompanying phenomena. In the domain of history, this meant a fresh start in the writ-

ing of histories of civilization in so far as the development of method was energetically taken in hand; description alone was no longer the watchword, but an intelligent comprehension.

It was now a question of following up the complex phenomena of the socio-psychic life, the working out of the so-called national soul in its elementary parts. The first step on this path would necessarily lead to the immediate analysis of the phenomena that appeared within the existence of great communities of men, that is to say, chiefly of nations. Hence the proving and detailed characterization of socio-psychic eras within this domain: this was the next step. We can see how this was done by Burckhardt who, in his history of the culture of the Renaissance, was the first to point out the great psychic difference between the so-called Middle Ages and the periods of higher culture. Thus a master hand determined and depicted one of the most marked phases in the rhythmic movement of the culture-epochs of a nation. From this point the way must lead on to a statement of the course of a whole series of cultural ages. This has been attempted in my "German History."

But this is only the beginning of an intensive socio-psychological method. In this blocking out of the culture-epochs, the elements of the socio-psychic movements, as such, are not analyzed, but simply touched upon and the time indicated in which great movements find their origin. When this is once well done, the question arises whether for these ages of culture there is one common underlying psychic mechanism, and if so, of what nature it is, and what is the aggregate of these underlying, yet apparent, psychic elements. And if these problems are solved, there appears further a last yet perhaps provisional question, namely, whether the psychic elements referred to are really elementary in the sense that they are to be found in the results of modern psychology as hitherto known.

This is not the place to analyze or attempt to solve the questions thus raised; but the means of finding an answer will be pointed out in the later lectures, at least in so far as to prove that, for the mechanism of the great socio-psychic movements, the same elements and laws hold good of which proof is given in recent psychological investigation, and with that of the

discovery of the elementary psychic energy proper to the historical movement. At this point there arises, in consequence of the preceding statement, another question. If modern historical science would penetrate to the innermost springs of universal history, find them to be in certain psychic conditions, does it act thus in conformity with the universal tendencies of the time, and has it accordingly the prospect of a wholesome duration and development? Here is the first difficulty to be solved. The second is as follows: if modern historical science as thus set forth is in accord with the spirit of the time, what is then its relation to and effect on other sciences?

For those who are acquainted with the intellectual movements of western Europe the first question — that of a more intensive study of all phenomena, a closer acquaintance with nature — is easy enough to answer. An impressionism which at first took hold of the external phenomena with a certainty of touch hitherto unknown was followed in the field of mental sciences and imagination by a psychological impressionism that discovered and revealed the

depths of the psychic life which till now had lain concealed under the threshold of consciousness. This spirit brought, in regard to natural sciences, an intensity of observation which appeared almost to threaten those mechanical theories which, during centuries of energetic research, had stood as true and sufficient for all further progress in investigation. In this course of psychic progress the historical science of socio-psychology takes its place as a matter of course; it is nothing but the application of greater intensity of observation to historical material. And there is prospect, therefore, of a further development of this idea, not only on western and middle European soil, but, since the new psychic existence is due chiefly to the vast extension of association and stimuli which arise from the new technical, economic, and social culture, it will establish itself everywhere where western civilization prevails, as is actually being shown to-day in the new world and in Japan.

If socio-psychological history is of such growing importance, the more, then, does its relationship to other sciences call for consideration, even though but few words can be devoted to it.

Foremost and clearest is its connection with psychology. History in itself is nothing but applied psychology. Hence we must look to theoretical psychology to give us the clew to its true interpretation.

How often, indeed, has not psychology been named the mechanics of mental science, in particular of the science of history? But the appreciation of this connection and the practical application of it are quite different things. For the latter it is necessary that the study of historical phenomena be extended to the most elementary occurrences and processes, — even those processes with which psychology has primarily to do. It is characteristic of the progress of science during the period of subjectivism of about 1750 or that at the beginning, at least, neither history nor psychology was understood. Of how little importance was psychology when books like Creutzer's "Essay on the Soul" and the fruitful but primitive journalism of the decades of Sentimentalism and the "Sturm und Drang" periods tried at least to set it free from the old traditional metaphysical theories. A universal genius like Kant was right to refrain from taking

part in such primitive beginnings, and this stage of philosophy corresponded to that of history.

Psychology and historical science begin to approach each other about 1800, under the influence of the new ideas of the time; but they were as yet far from meeting; between them still lay heavy and bulky masses of scientifically unanalyzed psychic matter.

How different it is to-day in the first decade of a new period of subjectivism, which in so many of its parts seems to be a restoration of the old, only in a higher stage of development. To-day psychology looks back on two generations of investigators who delivered it from the deadly grasp of metaphysics and made it an independent science. Wundt followed Herbart. And now a younger, a third, generation is at work perfecting and amplifying the results obtained. These results, however they may vary and become matters of dispute, according to the direction of investigation, permit a profound insight into the legitimate course of individual-psychic life, such as was denied to our predecessors. The most important results of all this investigation for the historical student are

recorded in the works of Wundt, Ebbinghaus, Münsterberg, Lipps, — collections of data which have already become indispensable to the allied sciences.

This is a condition of things extremely helpful to historical science in the socio-psychic direction. If one penetrates into the depths of historic causation, it will be found that psychology has prepared the way and has become a safe guide to the historian who wishes to make known his discoveries in formulæ in which they may be fitly expressed.

In this way have psychology and historical science entered into partnership. The partition between them is giving way, and certainly one may say — if it may thus be expressed — that psychology increasingly serves as a mechanical force to history.

But the relations of the two sciences are by no means thus completely described. Just as along with the psychology of the normal adult there must be kept in mind that of childhood and old age in order that the antithetic character of all psychic processes, the full extent and the whole circle of the potentiality of the human psyche, as far

as the individual is concerned, may be appreciated and the corresponding biological functions be observed, so it is necessary to obtain a full comprehension of the meaning of the socio-psychological process in history in order to proceed in a manner quite analogous. In this instance psychology is dependent on history, and only from an intensive investigation of the cultural periods of mankind as a whole are the data attainable which will enable one to recognize the antithetic tendencies of the human mind in its whole empiric compass.

Thus we get a starting-point from which the relation of modern historical science to the other mental sciences may be explained. These may be divided into applied, such as theology, jurisprudence, political economy, politics, etc., and into constitutive, history of language, literature, art, etc. It is clear that the constitutive branches simply disappear as parts of modern historical science. For if the latter concerns itself with the investigation of the dominating social psyche of the times in question, and with its changing forms during the various ages of culture, it can only do this by taking a survey of all its embodiments in history from time to time.

These are to be found in language, in poetry, and art (*i.e.* style), in science and philosophy, the climax of intellectual attainment, argumentation, etc. And correspondingly, socio-psychological history is the universal foundation of all these sciences, and these are related to it as amplifying and special sciences. But even more is this the case with the relation to the applied mental sciences. For the latter, which have reference to a certain given psyche of a certain cultural period, require a general knowledge of this period, which leads to the socio-psychological science of history.

Historical science therefore plays a double part: (1) as the basis of the practical as of the theoretical mental sciences, and (2) as stimulus to a historical method within the range of psychology. It is a position which is quite normally conditioned by the fact that psychic movements pass, as regards time, far more rapidly than physical movements, and that the change appears to us qualitatively different on that account. If in their relations the psychic developments of a given time had corresponded to the physical, only one mechanism would be needed to domi-

nate them both; for they would have shown a hundred thousand and more years ago the same character as they show in the traditional records of to-day. Now it is well known that where the conception of life is in question, that this is not the case; for example, in animal and plant organisms. In human life, *i.e.* in history, a moment of much quicker change of phenomena intervenes. How is it to be controlled? It can only happen in that psychology as a psychological mechanism is allied with a functional idea of the time and becomes at once variable. And this functional idea historical science must supply. Through this it grows to be an evolutionistic psychology fully suited to the actual course of things and as such the basis of mental sciences, both theoretical and applied.

Is not the relation of historical to natural science determined by the last few remarks, even if these are only general propositions? I think so, if one does not indeed include physics and chemistry in the historic point of view, — sciences the objects of which belong to the passing moment. However, if one does this, nothing remains but to admit that there

are biological agencies even in inorganic nature; with this we are driven out of the sphere of science into the atmosphere of hypothetic philosophy, into the metaphysical mode of thought.

It is not necessary to transcend the bounds of our subject, to pass over the border line that divides philosophy and science. But one thing has been determined by these reflections, — that the modern science of history has opened up for itself a vastly greater field of endeavor and conflict and that it will require thousands of diligent workers and creative minds to open up its rich and in many respects unknown regions, and to cultivate them successfully.

LECTURE II

THE GENERAL COURSE OF GERMAN HISTORY FROM A PSYCHOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW

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For some months now I have been in the midst of this nervous, rushing American life. From every side one is impressed by the sense of vastness, of incalculable possibilities. I have peered into new forms of historical existence, which, though I may not altogether comprehend them, have yet been suspected and vaguely felt. Still the effect of this vastness, the impression it makes upon the mind, was hardly dreamed of before I left Europe three months ago.

But I wish to speak to you of the old world, not of the new; and not simply of the passing things of this old world; rather of its recent progress won by strenuous effort in a particular field, that of historical science — possibly also of some labor of my own in this field. It is with the greatest diffidence that I venture in this

company of trained specialists to treat historical problems of the first importance to us all. But after all, Uhland's line holds good for every German, — "The brave Swabian knows no fear." And as for the historian there is always one recourse open to him if he would make himself more easily understood, the one that was originally his first weapon: he can examine his subject and begin to describe.

And so let me introduce to-day the problems of recent historical science, of which I shall speak again in later lectures, by telling you the story of my own people, from about 500 B.C. up to the present time. "The story of the German nation in one hour?" I hear you ask. Yes, in one hour. And it depends a little on the nature of the questions that will occupy us in a later lecture (taking it for granted that the venture can be made), how the story can be told in a single hour.

In the last centuries before, and the first after, the birth of Christ we meet with the Germans, for the most part our common ancestors, in a psychic condition which on closer view is very amazing to us of later growth. Their imagination, to begin with this most symptomatic of

all psychic functions, rich in accordance with the output of their strength, does not show itself in any poem, any drama, any musical composition, any piece of sculpture or painting. And yet it is active in the highest degree. It includes, at bottom, all the above-named kinds of imaginative activity at one and the same time; there was no song that was not accompanied by gesticulation and plastic pose of the body, as by a musical handling of language; no solemn function that did not take a poetically musical form; no creation of plastic art in which mimic *motifs* suggesting speech and modulation had not made themselves felt. With this universality of imaginative activity, its forms of expression are of course always accompanied by all the lofty elements of existence; as, for instance, birth, betrothal, marriage, death; the primitive economic life of the household, — of justice, morality, — the changes of nature in spring and autumn and the feelings they call forth; above all, in the great festivals of intercourse with the gods. "Here were the gods themselves accounted as present on solemn occasions; they were greeted with joy and escorted to the villages and the dwellings of

the people; they were offered hospitality and accompanied on their way. Sometimes a youth, sometimes a maid, was deemed worthy of the honor of representing in human form the superhuman; and where they fell short of such bold materialization, they at least led forth in solemn procession animals dedicated to the gods. The divinity was received with high honors when for the exercise of his divine calling on earth he became visible to human sense. Who has not heard of the chariot of the god of plenty, Nerthus, which, drawn by kine, went through the land in spring to take possession of the newly awakened earth? At every fresh landmark there greeted him the solemn procession of husbandmen, and to the accompaniment of rhythmic movements were attuned the songs of praise and gladness."[1]

What was the underlying element of this wonderful psychic attitude, of this primitive unity of imagination, — which, though occasionally interrupted, was yet appearing everywhere, — with its influence evident in all phases of existence?

[1] K. Lamprecht, "German History," Vol. I, 3d. ed., 1902, p. 177.

To this period, to the Germans of the little tribal communities, of which there were about a hundred in the nation, to the warrior who lived contentedly in the setting made by the natural organization of his race, and in the fulfilment chiefly of genealogic duties, — to him the world was not yet something conceivable, capable of portrayal, but only such as he saw before him, and hence the image of it in his mind was simple, palpable. No matter what important affair of life had to be dealt with psychically, it was not described in definite terms and made fast by convictions. It was reproduced allegorically, and its meaning repeated in psychic functions which expressed it externally by means of symbols. Let us describe otherwise this condition so foreign to our comprehension and therefore not easily accessible. The mental scaffolding of any sort of idea, or any sort of volition, was at once personified in a significant action, and appeared symbolized in the forms of an imaginative activity whose influence was as yet little refracted in rays. Thus intuition and thought coincided, and mental culture, the psychic existence of the time, took a symbolic form.

Symbolism, therefore, in the sense just described, is the true mark, the characteristic peculiarity of these earlier periods of history. To this, as to all central phenomena, all single psychic activities are subordinate: thinking resolved itself into analogous conclusion, the proper intellectual function of symbolism; volition found expression in transactions before the court and the community, in the form of an elaborately developed symbolic jurisprudence; lastly, the emotions in their most exalted form, religion, put their stamp on the forms of the intuitive philosophy just described. And as the main functions, so were its derivations symbolic in their most important and permanent developments, — language, art, philosophy, morals, and customs. Legal symbolism took hold of morals; indeed, the latter was completely controlled by it. Philosophy melted into mythology, which transformed the most important phenomena of nature and human life into a world of gods, who lived behind these phenomena, creating and guiding them, — an exalted type of visible reality. Art, limited to simple cloth patterns, was made to express that element of the world of phenomena which, earli-

est of all, took shape in the minds of men, — rhythm, movement; and in moments of conscious exaltation, language fell in with this rhythmic usage in its peculiar Germanic fashion, by an interweaving of the parts, and by a heavy stress not so much on the beautiful in form as on significance of the contents.

Therefore, however difficult it may be to distinguish from among the meagre information of this time the earlier and later tendencies of development, there existed a great unity of the psychic life. And we can see how it finds expression in a particular personal ideal, whose acts in turn reacted powerfully upon the general thought of the community. In this world of symbolic life the individual vanishes; he becomes at once the actor in a universal psychic life, becomes part of the whole, a coequal member of a community side by side with others of the same standing.

It is, in fact, what distinguishes the external Germanic culture. We see the nation without a bond that could hold it together politically become divided into a great number of tribal communities, — of clans. The approach toward

intellectual equality of individuals brought no tendency to a closer union of the whole, as is certainly required by a division of labor and by labor unions; and this was favorable to a differentiation of individual activities in the later stages of culture. Still, the tribal communities turn out to be not simple but complicated formations. They consist in a number of hundreds; and in these the German actually lived. And the hundreds bear distinctly a genealogic character, are at bottom great families or clans. In the family, therefore, is the German quite at home; it encircles him with its uninterrupted life, and within this he is accounted only a specimen, not an individual; he is subject to the system of blood vengeance with the psychic point of view which puts every individual on exactly the same level; in his personal preferences, in friendship and enmity, he is bound by the bonds of family life; he appears to the outsider, and according to our views also in purely personal matters, as if he were interchangeable with any of his equals, as if he were but a function.

And this contraction, or rather almost complete negation, of what we call personality, in

the natural division of the family, shows the manner in which the individual can be made use of in the building up of a state, in the constitution of the tribal community. The state is the army, and citizenship is comradeship,—comradeship in the sense of complete subjection to the whole; in the sense of an almost complete loss of personality even for the prominent hero.

Upon this comrade-like and natural connection is based the most modern of all these institutions, the home of an agricultural unit.

According to families and hundreds land is apportioned out as booty among comrades; hence the form taken by primitive farming strongly resembles communism. After all these impressions, can we wonder that the Romans thought the Germans in appearance scarcely distinguishable from each other, with great similarity of physiognomy? that their greatest ethnographer, Tacitus, founded on this similarity in outward appearance the definite statement of a "gens propria et sincera et tantum sui similis"?

But two or three centuries after Tacitus this little world was set in motion not only externally, but psychically. And five to six centuries

later we find a markedly new psychic attitude, which lasts on into the eleventh century, and which is distinguished from the earlier in all respects, — a radical distinction. What did not the migration of nations mean for the German? The breaking up of an old, the opening up, if not at once constructing, of a new world. The German language still bears in its broadest features, in the adoption of expressions for a better management in house and garden, in meat and drink, the ineradicable traces of the influences which emanated from the satiated culture of the empire into whose long-cherished peace the Germans burst with destruction in their hands. But side by side with these more common and even to-day occasionally controllable results, appear a countless number of the finer influences, perhaps on that account the more effectual in their operation on the Germanic soul. From the sad moral and intellectual conditions in the Merovingian kingdom, as in the Germanic dominions on the Mediterranean, we see that in the first place an almost complete dissociation of the psyche took place. What had been ordered and was pleasing in the eyes of the Lord came

to naught. What had been significant with transcendentally symbolic conceptions passed away. Like a rushing flood carrying ruin upon ruin with it, the fierce waves of a foreign culture burst in, destroying what existed; these are far from being easily controlled and brought within new spheres of restraint. Only very gradually a new element eliminated itself and quiet is restored. And there appears above the floods of this older culture now vanishing, and finally oozing away altogether, a new world, a type not essentially Roman, but a derived Germanic culture brought up to a higher level.

Let us view this new culture a little more closely. The older age had known as its chief signs of imaginative activity, and at the same time, artistic reproduction of the physical and psychic world of phenomena, the dirge and embroidery. In the dirge they celebrated the deeds of the heroes by giving expression, mimic, musical, and poetic, to their feelings, as Tacitus reports of Armenius, "canitur adhuc barbaras apud gentes." In the embroidery they had seized and held fast in the field of plastic art the rhythmic *motifs* of movement. In the

place of these forms of imaginative activity we see, since the migration of nations, other forms appear and flourish in certain internal changes down to the eleventh century, — the epic and the so-called symbolic decorative style. The oldest form of the epic is the heroic song, of which we have one still preserved in the "Hildebrandslied," from the pre-renaissance, the ninth century, a tale of the great deeds of a hero, recited with voices uplifted and accompanied by gesticulations, a tale brief, terse, and almost dramatic in form. Such a form could only have developed in the time of the migration; the oldest names belong to the migration, the bearers of which are known to us in abundant tradition. But since the eighth, if not the seventh, century this form, already decaying, yields to another, the legend-song, which tells of great men and bold deeds, but with loving minuteness of detail in later times, not seldom with almost the precision of anecdote — very near in its whole conception to reality, which it reflects poetically. This is a form which flourished in the last centuries of the age with which we are now concerned, the height of its development being reached about the year

900 A.D. Later there arises the tendency to become more circumstantial; it is marked by a taste for animal-lore, and ends on the one side in the realistic rime chronicle devoted to the handling of the present, on the other in the jest-poem of the thirteenth century, as characterized by Gottfried Hagen's "Book of the Town of Cologne," and, though in Latin, by "Discourses on Marvels" by Casarius von Heisterbach, as also by the thousand legends of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

This development of the epic runs parallel in plastic art with that of symbolic decoration. Here we see how the embroidery pattern of the former age gradually took on animal shapes till snakes, quadrupeds, and birds come to be represented, though very much distorted in movement.

And then we can observe how, out of the transition forms, the animal gradually emerges and becomes plain to us; in the beginning they appear only in general outlines, typical, however, in a positive sense of the word, so that quadruped and bird and fish — but not special families of these species — may be distinguished. But

after the seventh and eighth centuries, as if bursting out of a protecting husk, certain types emerge from these representations of universal kinds; out of the quadruped, a dog or a deer; out of the bird, a goose or an eagle. Even these were by no means conceived realistically, as one would be led to expect from the heraldic designs of the age. Faint traces of something new appear, which, in the course of the tenth century, blossom out into a glorious art, — plant decoration. The typical rendering of the moving animal is followed by that of the immovable, — the vegetable; again we note the general forms, so that leaf and stalk, though not of a particular species of tree or plant, become recognizable, whereas the actuating *motif* of the decoration of the preceding age finds expression in the most graceful, wavelike movements of branches and twigs. Here also, in the course of the eleventh century, a more pronounced individualization sets in. Tree, bush, and plant, weedlike and slender upspringing forms, can be distinguished, till, in a time closely following, even flowers and trees — and amongst the trees, oaks and birches — stand out; the taste of the time finally rises high enough

to choose for the tone of the object represented the local color rather than one taken at random, vivid and garish, and which in animal decorative work advances to the proportionally marked realism of the present-day heraldic figures.

One recognizes at once in how nearly parallel courses plastic art and poetry have developed, which, indeed, in these centuries were represented within the national development only by epic and decorative art. To one of the first periods of heroic song and animal decoration, there followed a second of the legendary lay and plant ornament, and the feature uniting them is that of an increasing nearness to reality, even when, at the close of the whole age, they first succeed in reproducing the symbols of the world of phenomena rather than that of individuals.

But is this feature not the same that distinguishes the whole imaginative activity of the new period from that of the preceding, prehistoric, Germanic age, except that the dividing line between the time before and after the migration is more marked than that of the seventh to the ninth century? For if the artistic concep-

tion of the world of facts had not advanced, even as far as to represent roughly the animal in motion, could it master anything besides the *motif* for movement in itself?

We have a fair example of this when a child, before the age at which he reproduces man and beast, draws with the pencil nothing but representations of movement, the strokes which are due to the unconscious, rhythmic guidance of his hand, and yet characterizes them as certain definite animals, — cats, dogs, horses, etc. If the reproduction of the psychic world be not advanced to the point of narration, must not this appear in the symbolic recital of the feelings of the hero, and in the pathetic reproduction of these feelings by means of the dirge? It was the correspondence of these feelings with the representation, that characterized primitive symbolism, just as the correspondence of visible movement, with the personal rhythm of the artist, belongs to this time. The following age, which we may now call that of symbolism, brings the resolving of feelings and movements into a shape of which the essence and kind appear in general outlines; it gives us the epic and decorative art.

With these observations, rather minute and detailed, we have recognized at once the fundamental difference of the earlier and later periods. The prehistoric ages embraced centuries of unconscious living in and with nature, whether it be the nature of the external physical life of phenomena, or the inward stirrings of the psyche. In the later ages man begins to give forth from himself these phenomena in a slow dawning of consciousness, he begins to appreciate them as objective facts given from out of the ego, and starting from this appreciation he learns to dominate them as an objective. This is a stage in the evolutionary process which has come in the course of German development, and the single phases of which form the period of the more strictly national growth.

But was the prehistoric age really so entirely unconscious of the nature of things and of the psyche? Is its separation from later ages absolute? All historical experience forces us to answer these questions in the negative. If we could know the conditions of still earlier ages of Germanic life than the so-called prehistoric age, we should find that there was an even greater

unconsciousness of certain aspects of things, and it is only in its character as the earliest known period that the prehistoric age appears absolute, — from which we have to calculate as with a given thing that cannot be further resolved into parts.

If we return to the period of the third to the eleventh century, to the age of symbolism, a more careful scrutiny shows that all further phenomena of this time, internal and external, depend on the character of the psychic essence as we have known it hitherto.

Is there need now to say that persons and things lived and behaved after the very simplest fashion? The statesman and warrior was a hero first, according to the ideal of the oldest epic song, and later, according to the demands of tradition and the art of poetry. The Teuton, just becoming the German, begins to appear as a type and to recognize himself as belonging to a peculiar race, at the same time plastic art had advanced to the complete reproduction of organic types. And these are the poles, hero and nation, within which developed the political history of the period treated, — a development and vitali-

zation of psychic qualities which are never understood without a deep knowledge of historical culture. Hence at the time of the self-recognition, since the beginning of the ninth century, say, the Romance and Germanic nations begin to grow up independently, each drawing sustenance from the great Carolingian power. Political history resounds again with heroic deeds and heroic song; diplomatic transactions bear the impress of the personal relation between hero and hero; the relations of the Papacy to Charlemagne are regulated by the promises of the Carolingian monarch that he would always continue loyal to St. Peter, and the traditions of the foreign policy of this time would have become epic in form if the Church, in keeping with the idea of Catholic succession, had not turned men's attention toward the work of the annalist. For what do we learn of Charlemagne through the national epic? Campaigns against the heathen and the Moslem, expeditions to Jerusalem, and a thousand other things which tradition, in so far as it corresponds to reality, rather surrounds with numberless illusive suggestions, than expresses in plain words.

But between the individual and the national commonwealth, when it is, for the first time, built up from internal forces, even though weakly propped, there appear a thousand forms of activity that plainly show the coming in of a new period to succeed that of symbolism. The individual breaks the bonds of tutelage, if not of the family, at least of the clan; he gains more freedom, though, according to our view, he is still subordinate to the old influence to a marked degree. He begins, however, to manage for himself economically, in an organization which bears the stamp of communistic and clannish domination; in political matters he is freer still. The state of the old tribal community with its close military comradeship exists no longer; it has given place to a more extended state-system. And over this there stretches, at least in the last centuries of this period, the one great national state. This new and greater state is not, properly speaking, a creation of the people out of their own resources, but a formation which is due in large measure to admiration for the splendor of the Roman Empire, therefore it takes the name of an empire, and its great

head surrounds himself with all the known forms and ceremonies of the departed Cæsars, which is the reason it could never be of lasting benefit to the people living under it. Yet the emperor succeeded in buttressing up this state by winning to its support the one growing nation it embraced, so that it outlived even the times of symbolism. It was characteristic of this period that moral standards were still determined by the earlier notions of restraint, though to moderns they might appear free enough; it was possible, therefore, to found upon this primitive morality an enduring relationship between the state and the nation: it was the principle of loyalty so characteristic of the Germans. Out of this grew feudalism, that unique system which depended so much upon the sense of devotion to one's superior — a system which proved to be one of the most enduring known to European history.

The period of the eleventh and twelfth centuries brought a tremendous social change; from early mediævalism we pass to late mediævalism, out of the age of the typical to the conventional psychic life.

Would this new period which continues on

into the fifteenth century appear in the light of a mass-psychological treatment (which deals radically and comprehensively with the narrower range of German history) as a period equally well defined and distinguished by real force and breadth of inner human interest, with that of symbolism?

One may well doubt it, for a survey of German history leaves the question open whether these centuries are not to be considered as a last epoch, a transition period from the age of types to that of individualism, embracing the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries.

Be that as it may, in German history this period is so full of life and so crowded with activity, that from the artistic point of view it would in any case be advisable to consider it by itself.

In order to come to a better understanding of the period, it would be well in this instance not to start with the statement of the psychic core of the new time, but with matters of its more external, economic, and political nature. Thus two great series of events demand our attention: one of which reaches back into the period

just discussed — the development of territorial rule; the other is that of the early city life and conditions.

The first settlement of the Germans was in homesteads and villages; peasant conditions were everywhere quite similar even to the extent of an almost equal distribution of the land, and thus things remained for a long period. But during the rule of the later Merovingians there began the breaking up of this comparatively fixed condition. There arose an aristocracy of great landowners, far superior to the great mass of average owners; and to be a large landowner was to be at the same time a territorial ruler; because for uniform cultivation of great tracts of land a rational economic life is necessary, which can only be reached by the employment of capital, which first makes its appearance in the higher stages of civilization. Great landed estates at the period now under consideration could only be made to pay by farming out the land to others. But these others, before the day of fairly plentiful capital, could not become independent farmers under contract of periodic payment for the land in use,

but must meet their obligations by serving in person and paying in kind. Hence came their personal dependence on the lord of the soil, and, in consequence, their political standing became that of the serf. The development was not that of great landownership and subletting, but of territorial lordships and serfdom.

It was a process that had vast psychic consequences. A social change began to take place, in the course of which the favored lord of the soil had leisure to take up intellectual pursuits, to live more intensely from the psychic point of view. It was a state of things which embraced at least a part of the clerical landowners, above all, the monasteries, say, from the ninth and tenth centuries on.

And this movement runs parallel with, and was alike cause and result of, a genuine acceptance of Christianity. How extraordinary had been those earliest stirrings of Christian piety: a spirit of asceticism expressed in the strangest castigations of the flesh and a faith in the miraculous which, limited by no consciousness of causality, thought it could remove mountains! And yet how mighty were the results of this

spiritual current! It burst forth similarly in France and Italy and swelled the tide of living waters on the waves of which the awakening lust of dominion of the popes of the eleventh century was borne onward till it exceeded in importance that of the old western primate of the Roman curia. Then Gregory VII, with wonderful political foresight, formulated the programme of this power, and making use of the reform movement which had spread in the meantime, raised it, especially in Germany, with heavy pressure on the temporal powers to be the acknowledged system of the Church.

During this time a change had taken place in the domain of territorial supremacy and serfdom; and this gave a political basis to a new intellectual life. The landlords had not been content with developing under their control a uniform class of farming sub-tenants. With the serfs bound to them by the obligations of service, they had classified these duties in grades and in this way set going a new movement. Hence there arose above the inferior cultivators a caste of superiors pledged to military service, who kept aloof from the lower order, strove to form a

degree of nobility in vassalage, gradually developing the ideal of the horseman, the military retainer. These are the good times of the rise of Ministerialism, the golden age of the first Stauffer period, when a Frederick I, with the help of his vassals, subjected northern Italy financially, and a Henry VI, with the same help, found himself able to rule over southern Italy and Sicily. But at a critical moment of German political history, when full of hastily formed plans for a campaign in the East and for the founding of imperial power along the Mediterranean, he died in the prime of life, to the great sorrow of the nation.

These were all events which must have aroused the great masses of the people and given them new conceptions of things; above all, the Ministerials. What could seem unattainable when vassals of the empire, whose children received the Emperor's permission to marry, might become counts, princes, and dukes in the new wonderland, Italy? All life had apparently become an adventure, and the more so because in the process of the development of territorial rule, even the subordinate peasants grew to be economically independent and respon-

sible beings. And out of the villages of the fatherland thousands and thousands of the youngest and best suited for colonizing purposes were sent into the East, into the countries beyond the Elbe, and along the Danube, to found that new Germany which composes two-fifths of the national possessions of the present time.

These are events which followed each other in rapid succession. Having an agrarian basis, they were at once the forerunners of a last purely agrarian culture, the culture of the days of chivalry of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

But these were not the exclusive tendencies of the time. Side by side with them other equally important events were occurring, out of which a primitive financial system, an early Bürgertum, an early town culture, arose. It is impossible to show here in detail in what manner this second series of developments took shape, because almost every one of the known or supposed events has been variously described and estimated. To enter into a criticism of these statements and judgments would mean a reversal of the entire economy of these lectures, even if the

remarks could be kept quite general. In such a case, moreover, our present conclusions would have to be tested by scrutinizing comparison with the results of careful investigation in similar fields outside the sphere of Western Europe, which, so far as the Germans are concerned, has not been done. So that in this connection it may suffice to say that in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the towns had been by no means unimportant in mutual reaction with the above-mentioned changes of territorial rule, which had permitted a surplus to be produced, and so led the way to a primitive formation of capital. These towns, with their early patriciate, with their commercial guilds and industrial unions, arose as a noticeable element of new national life, and in the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries developed for the first time a really middle-class culture.

If at this juncture we review the results of the great economic and political events of the new period, they can be summed up in the two words, chivalry and bourgeoisie. But who, at the sound of these words, will not think at once of the great intellectual value associated with them? Here,

on the one side, we have the times of knight-errantry and armed bands equipped for gallant adventure; on the other, resound the songs of Walther von der Vogelweide, — songs which tell of German customs and of the kingdom's pitiable plight; we have again the graver lines of Wolfram von Eschenbach; and Hartmann von Aue tells his tale with the flowing ease and grace of his wonderfully adaptive rhythmic measure. And the ideas thus made known to us in lyric and epic poetry, and which serve a many-sided didactic purpose, also find expression in plastic art. In miniatures we are shown the knight and the lady in the gracefully conventional pose of the time, — a mass of delicate lines of beautifully falling drapery enfolding the form, which with all its power seems born for self-abnegation. And from lofty pedestals there look down upon us statues telling of a satiated existence, as, for instance, in those of the choir of Naumburg Cathedral of the later years of the period of love-minstrelsy, no longer adorned with the conventional smile alone, but rather showing the slight beginnings of portraiture, — already tending toward a more realistic expression. It is at

once the period of clumsiness and grace, the latter becoming in the end the permanent element which marked the Romanesque (transition) style in architecture. With it came the decorative principle already strongly felt; *e.g.* the heraldic lion and the wreath of rue, from which sprang the virginal Gothic style, with its delicate features of early purely naturalistic decoration in imitation of the lesser plant forms. This period is followed by another not less important, — that of the early bourgeoisie. The town families gradually free themselves from the influences of chivalry which at first held them fast. Gottfried von Strassburg ceases to sing in his amorously frivolous way; the poetic prose of a pious mysticism resounds yet louder. For the old pietism of a formal asceticism, the religious fashion of the tenth and eleventh centuries, is past. It was superseded by contemplation and a belief in the working of miracles by human agency. So that a higher and final form of Gebundenheit gains sway; in a rapture of self-abnegation the soul tries to approach into the presence of God. Still the cares of this world remain as before, and out of

these comes progress. Poetry descends to satire and farce and lends itself to coarsest and realistic description, however much in the folk-song the spirit of prehistoric times is retained. And plastic art, lending itself to the rapid development of Gothic architecture, begins in sculpture and painting to reproduce in detail the visible world, — almost to a primitive mastery of portraiture; it even attempts, by a tentative linear perspective, to create space for the third dimension, and also to produce local color effect, chiefly in a complementary use of unbroken tones.

It is a new epoch; a thousand signs announce it. And it is clear that chivalry and citizenship, knight and burgher, turn away from the older forms of expression and hence from the soul of the period of symbolism. But do they understand the world actually and individually in the sense of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, of the Reformation and the Renaissance? Emphatically, no! Men are still separated from that great day by a world of progress.

Granted that men are no longer "typical," still less are they already "individual"; they move

in the intermediate stage of the conventional. Political and social forms show it. Neither knighthood nor middle class of the fourteenth and a part of the fifteenth centuries is free, but both are still in the leading-strings of the social forms of chivalry, and given over to superficial ideals of education. There arises here a tendency to emphasize the "maze," to be moderate as contrasted with the coarser outbursts of the primitive passion of the tenth and eleventh centuries. But this moderation is at first only superficially understood, and expresses itself in rules of etiquette. The burgher is socially freer than the peasant of his time; but their convivial habits are subjected to regulations compared with which the archaic drinking customs of the German student of to-day appear as the height of voluntary caprice. And how restrained by convention is every effort of the imagination! Nothing is more characteristic than that men are not acquainted with the individual portrait, and the literary portrait in the form of biography and autobiography is almost unknown.

However, the psychic stirrings of the age press on to a progressive freedom. The fif-

teenth century rushes on like a torrent to where its waters fall into the abyss of a deeper and broader river-bed. The current becomes confused, whirlpools form; nearer and nearer is heard the roar of the cataract, till at last clouds of foam dash upwards as in a veil and, at the same time, proclaim the presence of the cataract. In fact we approach, in the course of the fifteenth century, one of the most marked phases in the course of German national development: the age of individualism beginning to dominate the nine succeeding generations, — to the middle of the eighteenth century. And with it commences what we call modern times.

It is an age that can here be briefly described because it is better known. The true centre of its first period is the deliverance from the bonds of pietistic, doctrinal, and ecclesiastical conventions of the Middle Ages, while its second stage is dominated by the victory of the *lumen naturale*, of reason, in the movement which bears the name of the Aufklärung, and at the same time by the first great development of the natural sciences. In what consists the principle that unites these two phases internally? Can it be

characterized as an entire emancipation of reason to the full limit of its present active intellectual potentiality? Is it a question of a complete breach with the earlier time, and with its articles of faith? a rationalization of the world without exceptions?

It is evident that in the development of thought a new stage has been reached. The analogical conclusion, the conclusion following on the comparison of only two things, even in the later Middle Ages, often the conclusion of even scientific thought, is no longer considered sufficient; accumulated experience demands comparisons which can be extended to a great number of objects. The inductional conclusion grows out of analogy, and causality expels the miraculous. But it is a process which in the course of the whole period is by no means closed.

As the mark of transition to a higher form of causal consciousness, these centuries experienced the horrible reactionary movement of the persecution of witches. Again and again mechanical science, then in its beginnings, had to assert itself with considerable strength against the idea of the miraculous. And as late as the

eighteenth century even wide-awake minds believed in the uncanny power of good and evil spirits. It was, therefore, only a step forward to a higher causal consciousness which took place, not emancipation. Hence the most conservative among the new confessions and churches, the Lutheran, felt impelled to preserve intact the idea of the Sacrament as necessary for Christian salvation. Hence the more advanced Reformed Church did not at once take the final step of complete secession. And for the same reason even natural science continued to work in complete harmony with the highest conceptions of the Christian revelation, in particular with the conception of God as the extreme limit of thought.

If by means of all these phenomena this period is sharply divided off from the years following 1750, it is clear, on the other hand, what its gains signify compared with earlier psychic conditions. Above all, the individual, now a child of God, has free intercourse with his Heavenly Father, limited only by the mediation of Christ. There was no longer any mediation through the clergy and the host of mediæval saints, con-

fessors, and penitents. And still more, the individual, thrown back on himself, looked round him for the first time with unfettered gaze in this glorious and fruitful world. By the simple light of reason he tried to illuminate it; a natural law arose, a natural religion, and the doctrine of a common-sense education.

It is true that at the same time, under an increasingly one-sided development of the functions of a rapidly growing reason, the imaginative and poetic side of the mind and soul was neglected; indeed, even the development of the will was retarded. So that the individual appeared by himself — isolated — as a microcosm separated from all others. But were not the results stupendous, nevertheless? The Aufklärung of the eighteenth century is indisputably marked by a pronounced levelling, a characteristic style of its own, which, properly speaking, was the sum total of the results of the period, and which, because in itself homogeneous, continues to work itself out with unabated strength in our minds to-day, far more than the majority of people suspect.

And, at least in the beginning, this new,

later so purely intellectual, psychic life was alive and distinctly progressive in all other directions. The political history of the sixteenth century shows, in spite of all its conditioning by religious motives, a clearness in the working out of the will, which is lost later only in the increasingly complicated cunning of an intellectualistic diplomacy. In poetry it comes out in a reproduction of the psychic life which deals with satire of a realistic nature, on the socio-psychic side and with attempts at the psychic drama, on the individualistic side. In plastic art, especially in the true understanding of painting, the advance is extraordinary; linear perspective is developed almost to the point of a perfect mastery of its details; the light problem, at first very summarily considered, is, by the Dutch schools of the seventeenth century, at least in certain conditions of simple phenomena, artistically handled, and in the world of color we have accordingly a richness which had hitherto never been dreamed of.

If we inquire about the immediate causes of all these phenomena which we class together

under the name of an individualistic psychic life, an almost exclamatory answer is forced upon us. What incredible upheavals of material and political culture, what extensions of the moral and mental horizon, have not the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries brought about! In the towns from the fourteenth century on, under the fertilizing influence of the nation's new connection with the great currents of the world's trade, an economic impulse was given which was second to nothing in the nineteenth century, and probably superior. And corresponding to this one sees a thousand new political phenomena, — the development of an early spirit of adventure; the breaking up of the socialistic character of the trade and craft unions; a shifting of the lines of caste in the old patriciate and guilds; the development of menial work in the shape of domestic service and apprenticeship; the formation of a proletariat; the upheaval of constitutions; the striving after the levelling process of a new policy and a coarse communism. Outside of the cities spring up numerous states which first assume the rôle of a patriarchal, then rationalistic, absolutism; dissat-

isfaction prevails among the people, and social revolutions come and go without effect; a reactionary servitude is finally forced on the lower classes, the duration of which would only be determined by the weakness or strength of the classes involved. Out of all this there developed a class of nobles which, carried away with the foreign ideal of *l'homme du monde*, sought the court of their gracious sovereigns, but without cherishing any state policy of their own. Add to this those events of universal significance, — the voyages to the Indian seas, the discovery of America; the acquaintance with the peculiar mediæval culture of Peru and Mexico; the acceptance of the Copernican system; the discoveries of Galileo; Huyghens's investigations; Newton's explanation of the orbit of the planets; and finally Leibnitz's views of the world of nature and of history, and we have some of the dynamic forces underlying the new age.

These were impulses which brought to the universal psychic life, particularly of the earlier years of the new epoch, an untold amount of new stimuli, new possibilities of association,

new developments of the will, new fields for the imagination. And we can well understand how they at first brought confusion. Not a new illumination, rather a dissociation of the existing psychic world was the first consequence. In the chaos of the struggle between old and new the intellect staggered, the passions became overheated, the conscience was disturbed, and untold conflicts occurred between existing and growing rights. But nevertheless, between the cracks and crevices of an exploded culture, the new civilization steadily pushed its way forward, though at first misunderstood, laughed at, ridiculed; in the plastic and graphic arts there appears a new naturalism, a science of the *lumen naturale* arises, and a belief in the filial relation to God which nearly approached transcendentalism takes the place of the old more dependent faith. And when these new phenomena had somewhat developed, new psychic values appear. Who would now wish to dispense with God's Word as seen in Luther's mind and doctrine? who would leave out of the count the new knowledge of the state and nature, of man and the world? As men became

conscious of the new values, they used them industriously in accordance with the harmonious development of a cultural life which appeared to them infinitely higher than the old. A new psychic ideal rose victorious over the dissociative soul processes of the early time; the new idealism in art accepted the naturalistic gains of the time and applied them in its own way. New philosophies came to the front, and all the phenomena of this new world so transformed by science and discovery are subjected to them, and pietistic ceremonials grew out of the soil of the old as well as the new churches. In fact, the picture of a psychic revolution rises up before us, exorcised into existence by means of a new material and social culture, and a marked extension of the intellectual horizon; it is, moreover, the picture of contented accomplishment of victory won by the undisputed powers of the mind.

Quite different appear at first sight the processes which, about the middle of the eighteenth century, made the transition from the individualistic period to that which goes by the name of the age of Subjectivism, a new and more

extended socio-psychic period. It is a period in which creative work still goes on; for such personalities as Herder and Goethe, Schiller and Kant, still live with and in us. This epoch, the first part of which begins with the appearance of the so-called sentimentality, continues on through the Sturm and Drang, Classicism and Romanticism, Realism and degenerate Imitation, down to the seventies of the nineteenth century, to be followed by the beginnings of a second subjective period, the psychic phenomena of our own time.

This new age was introduced by no sort of visible revolution. By the middle of the sixteenth century, at latest, the great international highways of trade had been turned aside from Germany. Central Europe sank economically into a lethargy, while the states and countries along the Atlantic coast began to rise economically. Hamburg and the Netherlands were the only German states to profit by this change. The decline of the German character, above all of the German middle class, now sets in; it was hastened, and in a certain sense brought to a close, by the terrible losses of the Thirty Years'

War. The age of powerful stimulus and universal historic achievement by the nation was past. People withdrew within themselves, and the sinking level of national culture gave rise to an invasion of Germany for generations to come of a foreign civilization with all its disorganizing effects.

But among all these characteristic phenomena there was formed, about 1650, the substratum of a new culture and of a future higher psychic existence. The middle-class citizen was deprived of an undivided interest in his economic calling, yet not impoverished; living partially on capital which escaped the destructive hand of the Thirty Years' War, he commanded many hours of leisure, and he made use of them for his own spiritual and intellectual improvement. Hence the rise, by degrees, of the greater part of the so-called cultivated class, who about the year 1700 had spread over all parts of Germany, the more important because, besides the purely bourgeois professions, the greater part of brain-workers, officials and savants, and not a few of the nobility contributed to its rise. It was not the purely political, rather, in many respects, it

was a purely intellectual, soil of a new psychic life corresponding with the essential spirit of the time, to which were added more and more, chiefly by means of reading, an incalculable amount of new stimuli.

The first half of the eighteenth century witnessed the rise in Germany of more than two hundred and fifty newspapers and magazines suited to the needs of an educated public. And what was not discussed in these magazines! Everything which was of interest to this age of improvement, — poetry and philosophy, the latter after the methods of Leibnitz, and things more practical and political, too. In the course of a thousand communications the curtain was drawn aside and the events and conditions of Europe began to come again into full view. The public was taught to search the globe with its gaze even to the farthest horizon of the ethnographical world.

There were stimuli from which arose by degrees a new psychic disposition; the more so as it allied itself with strong reactionary feelings against the bald intellectualism of the dying age. It is true that every period at its close

tends to intellectualize the new achievements of its culture. Thus the later Middle Ages end with rationalization of the Gothic architecture in a flamboyant style; in music there was hardly anything left but counterpoint thematic work; and philosophy wound up in scholasticism. But the individualistic period, which is characterized by an innate leaning toward the cult of reason, inclined to this rationalization, seeking especially an understanding of the innermost soul-phenomena. What was more natural than that the reaction on the other hand should be the more pronounced and lead straight on to the new period? Pietism, sentimentality, Storm and Stress, are some of the elements belonging here. They freed from long servitude the functions of the psychic life which sought a response in another psyche in feeling and will. Now they burst forth with enthusiasm and introduced the new period of Subjectivism. Now these were the psychic functions which first characterize the personality of the time as subject-matter. Its emotional life develops from the cult of friendship of the earlier days down to the all-embracing national enthusiasm of the

nineteenth century; and just as, from its cult of the will, arises at first the idea of the genius of power (Kraftgenies), so later follows the iron policy of Bismarck.

Thus we come to recognize with great clearness — for there are thousands of sources of tradition — the process of the transition from one age to another, and the impetus of psychic dissociation whence are derived the complete and characteristic *dominant* of modern times. We can see how individuals who are in the full current of the movement are subject to countless new stimuli, and, being particularly susceptible to them, are not at first able to control this overwhelming influence. Again we see how they change psychically. Being, so to speak, no longer their own masters, they become too easily open to suggestion, whether it be that they, if of a tolerably creative nature, succumb to auto-suggestion, and become thereby a prey to the exaggerated conception of their own achievements, or yield to the stress of sentimental negation and romantic irony, to "Weltschmerz" and pessimistic tendencies; or, be it that they, inclining to socio-sensations, are influenced by

the new phenomena of the psychic life to such a degree that their judgment degenerates into the cult of genius, and their will becomes automatic in the direction of personal capricious imaginings and incomplete solutions of these moral problems which, with the appearance of every new psychic life, burst forth in overwhelming waves. But where such a strong and nearly pathologic action of new influences do not occur, we see the personality constantly weakened; with the self-sacrificing spirit of the investigator of new things, they yield completely to the new stimuli in order to master them.

These are conditions which chiefly characterized the years of 1750 to 1780, and again from 1800 to 1810 and even later. In them, just through this renunciation and readiness for suggestion, we gain a new, deeper insight than ever before into the world of nature and spirit. In art the first transitions to a realistic control of light appear; in poetry the more profound systematizing of the altruistic affectives, and, as the functions of the will are gained, these find expression chiefly in the new psychological drama; in the mental sciences the "folk soul," the popular

psyche, is revealed, which sets in motion expeditions into the domain of socio-psychic investigation, and with this discovery there runs parallel the endeavor to place psychology in general as a pure science outside of the domain of metaphysical influence. The beginnings of marked improvements in jurisprudence and politics are at once evident; the conception of individuality as a socio-psychical element leads to a new conception of public life, which, by means of the intermediate stage of personal control, is to work itself up to the constitutional forms of coöperative work for all. And legal procedure no longer appears as the fruit of a constitution imposed from above, but as the result of the operations of the popular mind.

A new life such as this bursts forth in a thousand shapes, and there was no side of the national development from the lowest to the loftiest that was not enriched by it.

The years are fast drawing near which will gather into sheaves the luxuriant, growing seedlings and store them safe in the granaries of national progress. After the Storm and Stress come the Classicism of Schiller and Goethe, the

philosophy of Kant, and the state-reforms of Prussia following the collapse of the year 1806. Romanticism, which developed out of the long-continuing undercurrents of the Storm and Stress at the end of the eighteenth century, was succeeded by the Realism of the thirties and the political unification of the nation as wrought out in the years 1848 and 1866 to 1870. Men began to understand themselves, and also this new subjective existence, which, so unmistakable and real, had grown out of the time of psychic dissociation of the earlier years of the century. And with it the great idealistic phenomena of the period began: the immortal creations of Schiller and Goethe, Ideal philosophy, realistic natural science, the unification of the nation to an economic life of unheard-of significance, the political and constitutional formation of the empire.

We have now reached our goal. The period just described, that of Subjectivism since the seventies of the century just past, must inevitably be followed by another just beginning. And that cannot now be discussed in full. But it is hoped that the contents of this lecture have

been such as to give us a general survey of the development of the Germans as a nation. Another question has been raised, and all the more definitely, for we have advanced into later times with increasing material at command: this will claim our attention at our next meeting. The question of greatest general interest, which arises here not only for Germany but also for other countries, is whether similar psychic processes mark their historical development, such as those described under the terms Symbolism, Typism, Conventionalism, Individualism, and Subjectivism.

It is plain, therefore, that we are now confronted with the problem of the psychic mechanism of the periods of culture. That such a question can be put, appears evident from the materials now available. How is it to be answered, and how solved? The next lecture will be an attempt to show this by means of the material already in use, as well as by taking into consideration the latest socio-psychic changes.

LECTURE III

THE TRANSITION TO THE PSYCHIC CHARACTER OF THE GERMAN PRESENT; UNIVERSAL MECHANISM OF PSYCHIC PERIODS OF TRANSITION

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We have outlined the development of the German people from its very beginning to the nineteenth century, and have noted how all outward events get the impress of their time and epoch. We saw that, after an age of symbolism in psychic life, say down to the third century A.D., there followed an era in which everything conformed to certain types, say down to the Salic line of emperors; that this again was followed by the conventionalism of the Hohenstaufen and of the later Middle Ages; that afterwards the mighty era of individualism set in with the Reformation and the Renaissance, which was in turn succeeded by the so-called age of the Aufklärung; that finally there ensued, taking its origin about the middle of the eighteenth century, the era of subjectivism, — including the

movements of Sentimentalism and Storm and Stress, of Classicism and Romanticism, — the first period of which ended about the year 1870. We belong to-day to its second period, which, it seems, is already approaching its end.

In this rapid enumeration of the vast psychic changes which are included in the course of these ages, we have always tried to follow up one particular moment, paying more and more attention to it as the sources continued to increase, the moment in which the transition of one age into the other took place. Our presentiment, at first vague, — typical events of the psychic mechanism of transition constantly recurring, — finally took the shape of definite assumption, so that to test it by facts seemed to be essential.

It is evident at first sight that recent facts which mark another transition are of special importance for such a test, since we have now so much better material for observation. We have, therefore, discussed this point more at length and in more detail than usual. It is especially the transition to our present period of history that brings us to the point in question.

It is highly instructive and it also serves our purpose to observe more closely the changes which have led to our own epoch. I have delayed a discussion of these phenomena until to-day, in order to enter somewhat more into detail.

A consideration of these events requires, even in so short a time as we have at our disposal, a somewhat general characterization of the psychological mechanics which underlies them, and this, as I think it will be shown, at least in so far as the nature of our data will allow, is identical with the psychological moments which have attended the earlier transition epochs of our history, a fact which is not surprising, since the whole process is certainly the outcome of general psychological laws.

The stage of evolution at which the German people have arrived was brought about through most radical economic, social, and political changes — changes which go back as far as the last decades of the eighteenth century. There appeared, even at that early date, in the country as well as in the towns, something of the modern "Unternehmerthum" (spirit of

enterprise); the owners of manorial estates in the northeastern part of Germany engaged in a considerable corn-export, especially to England, changed their wealth into capitalistic form, and began to sever the seigniorial and patriarchal relations with their villagers, looking toward the development of a class of agrarian wage-workers; the rising industrialists of the middle classes founded here and there their manufacturing plants. But these were only beginnings. Not till after the wars of independence did a somewhat stronger growth succeed under the influence of the newly awakened energy and as a result of a new unifying commercial policy, which was aimed at by the agrarian legislation of the Prussian reform-movement. Not until the years of Reaction so often misunderstood, not until after 1848, was there a full development of modern industry and capitalistic agriculture in Germany.

There appeared at this time, however, strong indications of what the result of the new system would be. The rapidly growing class of wage-workers had as yet made no general movement; the enormous emigration of the time testifies

to the radical social changes going on. The country noblemen do not seem to have much changed, though the psychology of the social groups behind the Prussian government of the time of reaction is still to be investigated. But in the towns there sprang up during the forties a new class of industrial workers, and there appeared, in contrast to it, a new citizen aristocracy produced by the bourgeois spirit of enterprise long since in process of development,— beginnings of our present system of production.

In the meantime, however, while these political and social changes slowly went on, the momentous political changes of the period of the unification of Germany gave to the country an altogether new social and intellectual outlook: 1848 was followed by 1866 and 1870.

After the creation of the empire and after the establishment of the close reciprocal relations with Austria, we find a new set of conditions, which now gave the first opportunity for the development of inner political and social ideals. The peace of 1871 was immediately followed by a turbulent forward move, which was somewhat stifled by the Berlin Crisis; but there began

soon afterward, under the cover of a protective tariff policy, which at once appeared to be indispensable, that growth of German industry which is still continuing, and which has even given, by its extraordinary intensity, another character to the country itself. Still, this development was not without a bitter after-taste; agriculture did not share the fruits of the new situation, because it suffered by foreign competition, and thus the social elevation of those dependent upon it has not been realized.

Under the constant growth of population, a rapid rise of the entrepreneur classes, of the bourgeois manufacturers and merchants as well as of the fourth class, takes place; the importance of this movement is evidenced in the formation and growth of other classes. The rise of new professions changed at the same time the whole character of the old social classification. Farmers, artisans, and last, but not least, the different classes of intellectual workers, so numerous in Germany, and to which belong not only the so-called liberal professions and the officials, but also the army officers, all received an entirely different standing; the semi-sacred-

ness of the position of the latter classes disappears, and they must now prove their economic value to the community by their deeds. Socially and politically the older orders suffered most by the radical changes which took place.

And yet it is clear that all these effects of the new economic development and class-formations were by no means the most general and the most profound. It was more important by far that the soul of the nation in general had been stirred up, that the old methods of thought and association had disappeared, and that they were replaced, for the moment, by a chaos of formidable extent. This vast psychic and intellectual revolution was reënforced by other influences. The development which took place in Germany was not an isolated one; it had begun in other lands, too: in the countries of Europe and beyond the ocean, especially in North America and Japan. The effects of these changes were in the main produced by the rise of the technical sciences, which totally revolutionized the means of communication: the world appeared altogether different; experience was widened in a thousand directions; and the foreign policies

of nations had to be changed. These psychic changes were indirectly augmented by the circumstance that science with vastly increased activities began to search the remotest corners of the new domain of experience. Spectro-analysis is applied to celestial bodies, while the purely human affairs of this earth are subjected to all the scrutiny of ethnographical and historical science.

It is impossible to enter into the details of all these changes, and it is not necessary. We can easily call to mind the most important of them. What engages our attention here is their psychic effect, particularly in Germany, though the phenomena, thus limited to a narrow field, will in most cases be of the same nature as those which have been observed elsewhere.

The first effect of the revolution is a complete dissociation of the former socio-psychic conditions. The social changes with the resulting increase of city activity, with its nervous haste and anxiety, its unscrupulous abuse of individual energy, progress of the technical arts, and the extraordinary multiplication of the means of communication throughout the world, the rapid

development of all the sciences which deal directly with man, followed this enlargement of life: all these and a thousand other moments of modern development produced a great number of new stimuli, which neither the individual nor the community could escape; for they formed in their totality, so to speak, a new historical atmosphere. But the individual as well as the soul of the people as a whole, being continually surrounded, besieged, and permeated by a flood of new impressions, soon lost the former self-mastery and weakly yielded to the new stimuli. This went on, in the beginning, under a strong repulsion of the higher moments of will; energy was absorbed in a high degree by the acceptation and augmentation of the new stimuli, and was thus limited to an energetic volition in economic life and to a marked receptiveness in the domains of the higher intellectual culture. Moral standards[1] and intellect were taxed to the utmost; they were subjected to the perpetual assault of the new stimuli. This is the cause of the general nervous excitement, which now began and which often came to light in patho-

[1] "Anschauung."

logical investigations, — it was now that neurasthenia was discovered as a special form of disease, — and which has not abated until to-day, but rather entered into the very psychic nature of the present and has become a constituent of the excitability[1] or mental attitude of the age.

There appeared hand in hand with this increased irritability, according to the law of interaction, and as a sort of accompaniment, a condition of motor-psychic weakness: quick but shallow excitation of the will and a strong tendency to the enjoyment of excitation became general, because the much-desired compromise of excitations was never produced; excitations followed each other so rapidly that the even temper of mind, the *æquitas animi* of the ancients, was only seldom acquired.

These were, and partly still are, conditions which can be observed in all departments of life, but most distinctly among the entrepreneur class and in the new society. The entrepreneurs, the social and political leaders of the upper bourgeoisie, are above all typical representatives

[1] "Reizsamkeit."

of this modern Reizsamkeit. How does this class of men despair during great economic crises, then how rash are they in periods of prosperity! And how irregular do these people appear in their pleasures, when, after the excitement of the day, they repair either to the exciting charms of color and form in a modern home or to the modern theatre or concert-hall, where the mind is kept in constant tension!

Even the laboring classes created under the new conditions are subject to similar, though modified, psychic impressions; up to what degree is shown by the fact that special forms of psychosis, as, *e.g.*, the traumatic one, have appeared in that class as well as with their employers. Have the older classes remained untouched by the modern psychic state of excitability? We can hardly say positively that the peasants themselves, since they have exchanged their chalk-accounts on the wall-door for the ledger and begin to read the market quotations, remain untouched, not to speak of the artisans, who have been seized by the rush of industrialism in the cities. What of the intellectual classes? The new nervosity is winning

its way among them in various unobserved, and therefore most devastating, forms.

This Reizsamkeit is something new. It is a form of socio-psychic dissociation that did not exist in earlier times; even the forms of dissociation of the first period of subjectivism, sentimentalism, and romanticism are, in spite of all typical similarity of the progress of events, intrinsically different; and it would be one of the finest and most attractive tasks of modern socio-psychological detail-investigation to fix this difference in its minutest variations by means of an extensive comparison of the two classes of historical data.

The new and very marked state of soul-life, brought about under the influence of innumerable new stimuli, began immediately to produce new elements of culture. It is the transition to the psychic life of recent years, as contrasted with the last appearances of the psychic life of the first "subjectivistic" period, as contrasted with the realism of the natural and mental sciences of the thirties to the sixties of the last century, as contrasted further with the epigonistic philosophy following Hegel, and of the

inadequate Rubens-Rembrandt colorists' system in the domain of painting, as contrasted with the gilt-edged Liliputian lyric,[1] the professorial-novel, the feuilleton style, and the theatre of Paul Lindau in the domain of poetry. This is, especially in the domain of the imagination, the transition to open-air painting and impressionism.

These movements began in Germany as far back as the seventies; they become clear, decided, revolutionary, and finally victorious in the eighties. It was the era of a new naturalism in which one discovers, in the exterior appearance of things, new features, new sides, and new qualities. Liebermann and von Uhde were beginning their careers; Liliencron was producing his wonderfully detailed poetry, the truest to nature yet known, also his battle songs of 1870. Indeed, it was the epoch of the new naturalistic novel, and of the short story with its complete subordination to the minutiæ of life. But soon the devotion, with which it had been applied to the immediate reproduction of the exterior world, begins to extend to the inner life; there

[1] "Butzenscheibenlyrik."

appears by the side of the physiological impressionism, replacing it partly since the end of the eighties, a new psychological art. The art of painting begins now to seize the impressionist qualities of subjects; and efforts are made in the novel and drama to portray natural processes which had hitherto never developed into consciousness, or to reproduce them in the mind of the hearer by exciting the feelings; lyric poetry, too, aims at a most delicate reproduction of the stimuli, the *audition colorée*, the colored sensations of touch, the sounding taste, the tasting sense of words. These are the years of the fully developed naturalism of the open air, of a fertile lyric of the highest perfection of form, — the brightest period of Skarbina and Kühl, of Stephan George and Hofmannsthal.

Not only the works of the imagination, but also those of science, are subordinated to the new psychic state. The natural scientist and the psychologist make their investigations under pressure of an unheard-of nervous tension; the historian penetrates the depths of the development and life of individuals and tries to become

the master of a most refined individual-psychologic method and style. Under these circumstances science, having a tendency to minute division of labor, comes into closest contact with artistic naturalism; however, the intermingling of the two in Germany was not so complete as in France. German culture has not yet produced such a man as Taine, the historical artist of *petits documents;* nor a Zola, to whom the novel was an *œuvre scientifique* and a collection only of *documents humains.*

As imagination and intellect were worked out upon the basis of Reizsamkeit, so in the realm of feeling and of volition we find a similar development from the same foundation. By the circumstance that the memory could not master at once the innumerable stimuli, — and from this comes the complaint of a supposed diminution of the strength of memory and of an overpressure on memory, especially of young people, — the emotions were touched; a state of continual excitement was produced, which was but too easily combined with the general nervous excitement of the new period.

Thus was bred a pathos of the individual,

but a rather shallow one; constant excitement seemed to be a sign of constant happiness. Since these formed the basis of the freer development of impressionistic art and science, it is clear that they were again characterized and made fertile by the same. Shading off into the almost imperceptible, objective unconscious growth became the watchword; the slightest variations in color, the indefinite titillation by minimal dissonances of the tones, the gentle rustling audible in the building and the interior rooms, suggestive silence in conversation, were sought. By way of contrast people seek deafening music, a life in the streets filled with the greatest discords of movement, of visual phenomena, and of tones; business-meetings are characterized by craftiness in the settling of material interests, competition and the idea that "might makes right" take precedence; on all sides there is hypertrophy of enjoyment or of success.

But there was to be found — in spite of these efforts to build a new home of the soul full of inner harmony — susceptibility to suggestion and receptivity to the most important questions

of life. With conservative natures the value of that which bears the stamp of age, that which looks old, even, appears all-important,— what has been done must continue to be done. Clerical and political feudalism thus remains triumphant, and there arises by the side of the archaic forms of intolerance the intolerant self-advertisement of chauvinism. But to those individuals, however, whose temperaments ever lead them forward to new ideas and new values, it is given to understand, according to the strength or weakness of their perception, the most characteristic criteria of an epoch. The first class feel in themselves the overwhelming impulse to deny, to dispute, even destroy everything which seems to be novel; and thus this period begins with pessimism, whose superior power has been the undoing of the lives of many, chiefly juvenile, creative natures, and it closes with the tragic person of Nietzsche, and the consummation of his fate, which is to a certain extent typical of the time. Wherever the desire for negation in creative natures, who become all too easily presumptuous, even imagining themselves to be

demigods,[1] turns in the direction of monomania, and thereby begins to become positive, a fatal neologism appears, a worship of the novel, of the extraordinary. Thus the word "sensational" becomes a fashionable expression, especially in the first period of Reizsamkeit; spiritualism and thaumaturgism, belief in the mysterious, mark its further progress. Combining neologism and negativism, we meet the cult of the hateful, of the decaying, and of the perverse, and a tendency to psychic prostitution, which is so characteristic of a considerable part of the early impressionistic literature, especially of that produced by women.

Parallel to the auto-suggestion of creative natures we find the suggestibility, the blind devotion of receptive individuals, of the masses: thus is produced a real automatic action of emotion and of will, and a formation of cliques and hero-worshippers, and as a result of these two influences it comes to be the fashion both to admire and to persecute independent persons.

The socio-psychical side of individualism suffers because of these social tendencies. The

[1] "Übermenschen."

former motives of activity for the average citizen have almost entirely disappeared; former religious and moral ideals no longer influence men vitally; an egotism, devoid of higher control, develops economically, under the badge of free competition, into formidable proportions and governs politically, under the mask of a policy of power (Machtpolitik), not only the tendencies of expansion of the nations, but also the very motive and purpose of science.

But have all these forms of dissociation of the old socio-psychic state been actually completed? And have they remained without counter-effects which annihilated at once a part of their influence, or prevented its development? Have the conditions, as described above in their sad and broken tones, ever actually existed?

These are questions which can be answered somewhat in the negative. In the very beginning of the dissociation there set in at once a process of new formation; and the very elements of dissociation are, considered from another point of view, so to speak, positively charged and contain creative power. Has there not arisen, in the last decades of the nineteenth

century, out of the imaginative activity of dissociation, a new and higher naturalism, that of the impressionist? And has there not arisen out of the dissociation of the former combinations of volition a new economic view of life and a hitherto unknown system of national and universal politics?

However, beginning at this point in the process, a tendency to build up and to classify sets in. The social psyche finds again the core of its life; it looks for a new vantage-point in the flood of new phenomena. Thus the movement is continued under a new dominant note, under a new order of inner life; and it can be observed clearly that this movement, becoming especially prominent about the year 1890, is continually gaining ground.

Imaginative activity assumes the lead, and its outward expression is again especially clear and significant. In plastic art as well as in poetry a standard of excellence, especially in the reproduction of the natural world, has been reached which surpasses all former efforts; the reproduction of new life-phenomena, of the various soul-activities, was next attempted. But whilst

men thus occupied themselves with practical psychology, or even almost practical neurology, the standpoint was gradually shifted. The psyche, which, being engaged ordinarily in the observation of one's own inner life, now becomes the object of contemplation, begins as it were to become the subject of its own efforts, and thus projects its own character on the objective observation. Thus, when the dissector is about to dissect himself, the inner life reacts in the shape of a stronger accentuation of personality. And so what Wundt calls Apperception begins to play an important rôle: a new *dominant* has been won. This process was at first slow and sometimes invisible; naturalistic descriptions partook largely of personal fancy and mood; a quiet lyric tone characterizes this class of work; something harmonious envelopes and permeates it. Symbolism in painting and lyric poetry makes its appearance now along with the revival of the fairy-tale and the dreamlike drama, a sort of bewitching theatrical illusiveness enveloping it all.

But this was not all. Several great masters — especially those who had, even in the begin-

ning of the period of general transition, if not earlier, anticipated the psychic tone of the new period — had developed a strongly marked style: Bitzius and Ludwig, Hebbel and Anzengruber, Feuerbach and Böcklin, Thoma and Klinger, to name only the most important. They found themselves in full vogue; having attained distinction in the eighties, they were triumphant masters before the close of the century. It was seen that the general yearning was fulfilled in them, the longing for a new fully developed personality, embracing and personifying the elements of the latest culture, for a personal command over the surging chaos of the new stimuli.

In thousands of cases this longing after new things took a socio-psychic tone. The demand of the time was not merely for strong and self-contained individuals, but for a new system of morals, a new philosophy, and a new religion; the realization of these ideals took the form of an entirely original poetry. The climax of these aspirations for a new *dominant*, which seems to have been reached during the last five years, has brought a sort of initial stage of a

new style in plastic art as well as in poetic idealism.

Science has again taken the direction parallel to that of imaginative activity, and is advancing farther along in this way. Even in the natural sciences, which, in the course of two centuries, had developed the law of conservation of energy, as being a general hypothesis seemingly suited to all phenomena of nature, and being thus protected from all dissociations of its general basis, the merciless spirit of the new period has pointed out many occurrences which seemingly did not agree with this law; *e.g.* the catalytic and radio-active phenomena. These have yet to be subjected to minute research; and efforts have already been made to establish, with reference to them, a modern theory of energy.

It is obvious, however, that, in a time of great psychic changes, the intellectual sciences would be thrust into the foreground. In this very domain a strong reaction set in against the unsystematic, individualistic investigation of the last decades; an analysis of the phenomena, to be made from new points of view, was required,

and thus one came to the paramount methodical principle that, in the phenomena of intellectual life, the innermost, psychologic proceedings should be clearly understood, so that their reduction to general laws might be possible, be it laws of psychological mechanics or of evolution or biology. This is the impulse which is coming more and more to dominate the intellectual sciences, and the goal is a new synthesis rather than the detail work of the last few years.

When thus the imaginative and intellectual activities entered into the vast sea of modern stimuli, taxing their own lines of development towards new *dominants*, a general stimulus seems to have been applied. Men began to collect their forces again in the several lines of human endeavor; personal motives and aims were soon more clearly defined and often not quite so high-flown; the excessive demands of the so-called Übermensch[1] gave place to the more simple and yet entirely modern postulates as well of individuals as of the state, and in society. Ethical movements with high-set altruistic aims begin to take form — a universal

[1] "Übermenschentum."

peace being one of the chief of these; a so-called aristocratic feeling or appearance became the first demand of cultivated society; piety was no longer considered a luxury; the former exchange of æsthetic and religious devotion disappeared, nobody regretting or perceiving its loss. The great unifying elements, society and the state, gain the first place in men's minds, and that not because of the influence of a distinguished personality, like that of Prince Bismarck, but as a result of entirely new tendencies and motives in the lives of individuals. Unreasonable economic competition was first attacked; new legislation corresponding to recently developed social-moral ideals was enacted; men felt the old avenues of progress, opened by the laissez-faire policy of the years just passed, closed by the new ideals of a growing moral and clerical cosmopolitanism.

These are the latest movements; with this description we have arrived at the very gates of the present.

Let us now proceed to the second problem, whose solution is the concluding part of this lecture. Out of the detailed description of the

socio-psychic transitions, which led from the last period of culture up to the present time, and out of the descriptions of similar transitions leading from one cultural age to another (given in the first lecture), we must try to develop the typical picture of such phenomena of transition. And this requires us to draw from the motley crowd of single processes their psychologic essence. The resulting psychological force which is recognized to be at the bottom of all our observations will then be traced through all its stages of growth.

In accordance with these requirements note first the beginnings of the socio-psychic changes. We see at once in each individual example, because of an overplus of new forces, the reflex of a host of influences, — stimuli, events, and facts. And all these things act more or less sharply upon the inner life of every contemporary, whether he will or no. The influence of these stimuli becomes stronger, the more they are reënforced by the psychic triumphs which grow out of the contrasting of the effects of psychic events which have disappeared, or which are just vanishing, with the new ones.

Considered from a purely psychological point of view, what is the outcome of these motor-forces?

They produce new experiences of self-consciousness. And there are formed accordingly new bases of sensation and observation and of their complexes, further on new relations of the ego, and finally new contents of ideas, which correspond to all these new subjects of self-consciousness. Besides, feelings (which always accompany these proceedings) are produced, — aspiration, volition, etc. And these changes of the contents of self-consciousness as well as of the phenomena of feeling, which accompany them, consist in differentiation, modulation, and shading off of the various classes of sensations already considered. But does this result, this sum of new contents of self-consciousness and feelings, produce a new historical life? Have we in these a certain precipitate of that new life? It is necessary now to go on from the results and symptoms already observed to the events themselves. If we do this, there appear, according to well-known psychological laws, as active constituents of these events, only sensations, perceptions, associations, and dispositions.

It is evident that in the psychic processes themselves, which come into consideration here, the moment of volition appears somewhat to recede; less influenced by this and hardly touched at all by the feeling of aspiration, the psychic processes take place according to certain laws. And we therefore see clearly at this stage of our discussion why the history of culture in the truest sense has to do less with the complicated psychic processes (as they occur even in the most simple activity of will) than with the more self-evident incidents of sensation, perception, and association. Still more. The last-named incidents are in fact historically the more elementary, and, therefore, those most easily recognized. The history of culture becomes the fundamental branch of historical research, as it is, above all, and essentially, based on psychical phenomena and treats only by the way the particularist tendencies. For in what other way can a fundamental historical science be developed, if not by going back to the most elementary experiences of the soul-life? All the secrets of the natural sciences have not been unlocked either by a single master key

such as the philosopher's stone, or by a system of natural philosophy, but by the solution of quite elementary problems, such as the inclined plane or the laws of gravitation.

When, however, in times of transition from one cultural epoch to another, the excitations of these elementary incidents throng into the soul in unusually great numbers and, at the same time, in unaccustomed forms and in new qualities, the former equilibrium is disturbed. If one distinguishes in the soul-life, considered from the historical viewpoint, between the actualities of rising sensations, aspirations, and feelings, and a feeling which, as it were, governs and regulates them, a certain *dominant* would seem to have regulated up to this time the proceedings of actuality, due to well-known stimuli and incitations. But on the other hand, it turns out that this is no longer the case. The new era with its innumerable stimuli creates other forms of psychic experience, which remain foreign to the old *dominant*. This *dominant*, so to speak, the very kernel of personality, yields its foremost position, or, at least, loses a part of its controlling influence.

As a result, particularly in the field of intuition, the individual sense-impressions are no longer so clearly marked: forms of transition between the single effects of the stimuli begin to appear. And in the same way in the field of pure reason, argument and counter-argument, perception and counter-perception, are inextricably commingled; reason is superseded by mere supposition, by views based on general impressions. These are dissociations of the former psychical unity, relaxations of the existing unity-relations of empirical associations. This breaking-up process leads gradually to the auto-suggestion of certain sensations, which are thought to be especially modern, and of certain judgments, by which personality appears as being changed in an arbitrary way; or it may lead to suggestions of similar sensations and judgments in an independent manner.

A similar process takes place in the domain of volition. Here, and especially in the foreground, as it were, of volition, in the aspirations, there stand facing each other two elements in the inner man: on the one side the active aspiration, belonging to the *dominant*

of the personality, the tendency of the ego; on the other the impulses proceeding from the surroundings, a passive compulsion of outer influences. If these somewhat outward impulses prevail, or if they are merely marked in a relatively stronger way, there ensues a certain tardiness in final decisions, which — whilst the realization of the aspirations of the ego is always accompanied by pleasurable feelings — expresses itself in a painful vacillation and, at the worst, in pessimism[1] and melancholia. It may even happen that under the influence of external things, especially if they come with the pressing claims of being new, modern, that the source of aspiration and soul of individuality is almost choked out; that, viewed from the standpoint of the individual, a certain automatic action of will results; that there arise certain aspirations which cannot be repelled; and that, wherever an epidemic suggestion puts into action the imitative instinct of the masses, extravagant modes and mental disorders impel to a universal madness. Though we certainly shall not lay down the law that these exterior consequences

[1] "Weltschmerz."

have appeared regularly everywhere just at the point of transition to present-day culture, it even is evident that they existed in many instances at earlier transitional periods; that they were not totally wanting during the last transitions; and that, at any rate, a certain dissociation of aspirations was characteristic in a general way.

In consequence of these events the manifestation of individualistic energy often takes a somewhat morbid form; unsettled and weak already, the individual is continually excited and, being in this state, he yields to associations, perceptions, and interests which would otherwise be excluded because of the feeling of lethargy attached to them. The phenomena of negativism, self-torture, and perverseness belong, to a certain extent, to this domain. If one goes still more nearly to the roots of this connection, one remarks that the question turns on the energy of the aim-perceptions. If these remain sound and well grounded, there arises a very decided freedom of the will, and abnormal aims are wanting. If, on the contrary, this sense be more or less weakened, aspirations are directed, either in passionate impulsiveness or in blind

confidence, to aims which would appear under normal conditions as being at least very difficult of attainment, if not impossible. Ordinarily, a vacillation between the attendant feelings sets in, which produces the most different, often the most delicately varying, alternations between light-mindedness and passion. All these phenomena — as can be shown from the above — are characteristic of the transition to our present-day culture as well as of former transitions. But this is not all. The motor-conception may, in such a constellation and under the influence of contrary notions, retire, so to speak, into itself, so that nothing remains but an aspiration devoid of will and force: a general discouragement can only be the consequence. It is a well-known fact that this has been the case, at least for a while, at times of new economic crises and in similar phenomena, when the compulsion of passive, exterior counter-tendencies had attained an especially high degree of power.

Further, it is very characteristic that in a psychical epoch almost without a ruling ideal, bereft, as it were, of its very heart, the tendency to exhaust one's vital power in the existing

psychic functions manifests itself in an abnormal devotion to externals; one may say, in a positive sacrifice of individuality. This is the view which lies at the foundation of every nationalistic movement in the art of our time. If, however, this tendency is permitted to go to extremes, the most remarkable forms of curiosity arise, — a love for the deformed, the desire to penetrate into one's own inner life objectively, a craving for self-torture and self-mutilation, and, finally, even to commit suicide. And there is developed in the same way enjoyment of uneasiness, a sort of painful pleasure, a taste for dissonance of colors and of tones, delight in extravagances, in the fortissimo of music, and in loud and gaudy architecture.

This is why, at the beginning as well as the end of an epoch of this dissociation, the so-called mixed sensations play an important part. These consist in transition feelings between pleasure and discomfort, because there is a pleasure which consists largely of pain, bitter-sweet feelings; *e.g.* the sensation of greenish yellow, etc. To this class belongs also the decided development of sentimental feelings; that is to say, the

feelings of deep emotion, of tender sadness, and especially of humor; and again we have here the intensification of tragic sensations, which produced during the nineties of the last century a short but characteristic growth and development of dramatic art.

If we try to find, in the general course of the development, once more the fundamental *motifs* of these phenomena, we shall perhaps agree upon the following: individuality first yields to the overwhelming influences of a new, overpowering external world; then comes a decided reaction, yet without disturbing the inner counterpoise which marks the limit of sensation; the essence of individualism becomes more stirred up than before. There rise conceptions which, without the former control, lead to sudden and new judgments; external impulses are felt which cause, in consequence of the absence of sufficiently strong counter-motives, rash and unusual actions. Under these influences the ego is itself transformed. Whilst on one side the new, rich, and varying influences are overcoming the essence of personality, on the other that peculiar harmony

which hitherto dominated the more modest experiences is sacrificed. Devotion, or, more correctly speaking, the yielding, to the new stimuli, leads in art to a naturalism which reveals more deeply than ever before the motives of the outer as well as of the inner life, which abolishes, however, as far as possible, the temperament; as, for example, in Zola's definition of a work of art as a *coin de nature vu à travers un tempérament.* Yielding to these notions hinders the formation of collected judgments and at the same time the inner necessity of formulating an opinion on the cosmic position of man; action becomes subject to sudden impulses and often degenerates through them to the extremes of extravagance and weakness.

To put the whole matter in a few words, we may say that individuality becomes suggestive in a very high degree to the external world. And since this is its constant position, individualism becomes self-suggestive too; if it surrenders to the deceptions of auto-suggestion, it is at the same time more given over to the effects of the broad unconscious substrata of the new psychic life. Therefrom arise again new forms

of intuition, judgments, and acts, and in this way new spheres of inner life, which lay, up to this time, under the threshold of consciousness, are made distinctly visible: thus admittance is gained to new shades of sensation, conception, aspiration, and activity.

But this condition of the soul is dangerous in itself, and contemporaries, as a rule, recognize that this is the case. But how can it be remedied? Given the new world of phenomena, the immense sum of new stimuli, it cannot be set aside; it becomes rather the task of the inner personal life to adapt itself to surroundings.

For this two things are required. First, a greater breadth of soul must be gained; that is to say, the psychic power must be increased, so that the possibility of the simultaneous absorption of the new and more various psychic influences arises. Secondly, the soul must not only absorb this new world, but govern it from a certain centre. And thereto is required the complete realization of two different psychic proceedings. The soul must know, on one side, how to distinguish, to separate, and to analyze the new movements and

stimuli. But there belongs to this *Divide* also an *Impera*. Thus the mass of stimuli already described must be brought together through the soul, linked together, and despite all difficulties rendered serviceable to the inner ideal, to the *dominant* of personality in a last synthesis, after all contradictions have been removed.

It can, of course, happen that this way is not found at once; and, according to a well-tested and apparently unbroken rule, the signs of a transition period appear at this juncture; and in the particular instance of the transition to the culture of the present day, which has quickly gone by, though it has about lasted through the life of one generation.

One sees that the necessary psychic breadth, or, which is the same thing, the new psychic power of assimilation, is only slowly gained. The mind is not equal in the beginning to a complete mastery of the new phenomena. Hardly more satisfactory have been the attempted analyses of the phenomena of the present times. The sense of arrangement and classification is not yet sufficiently developed; even in the practical management of business affairs the number of

those who do not succeed is constantly increasing. Even more wanting is the command over the new forces. Science sticks to mere description, is devoted to mere objective study; art pays homage to a naturalism which is gradually becoming barren; idealism lingers in the same domain, for both imagination and reason have failed to reach out beyond the transient and the small detail work and to present the other departments of human endeavor with new materials.

At the same time, altruism, and all that is connected with it, the sense of fellowship among men, capacity for self-sacrifice, moral idealism, — all these tendencies are being crowded to the wall; egoism rules the day.

If this continues without interruption, it is quite clear that it must lead to total psychic decay. Putting aside for the time the aims and purposes of the present, there remain to us, in so far as the desires of men go, only the sensual tendencies; in the matter of feelings, only those things which aim at the satisfying of sensual impulses; and from the principle of association the memories of past influences alone

have effect. Even these conditions are changing for the worse, and we are moving toward a psychic state which, as we shall see later on, corresponds in a certain sense to those of a lower stage of civilization.

Was this — we cannot evade the question at this point — the sad pathway along which the highly gifted nations of the past have travelled to intellectual ruin?

In modern civilization, and especially in the phase of it with which we have been dealing, fortunately the victory of a new and positive force seems quite clear. And it is equally clear also that individual psychic phenomena are manifesting themselves, in which this victory has already been won or in which the struggle is still going on.

Individuality, so to speak, surprised, pushed aside, and, for some time, almost annihilated, reasserts itself and develops a new *dominant*.

Let us apply this statement to the important field of the fine arts. As opposed to the naturalism of art and poetry, we find the beginnings of a fresh idealism, which assimilates well new impressions and utilizes them technically, not for

mere reproduction, however, but in favor of an imaginative activity, so that the soul of the artist speaks through his work.

This is a point which must be treated in some detail in view of the interest that will probably be aroused later on in the study of imaginative activity. According to well-tested rules of æsthetics, the normal psyche recognizes the beauty of an object only when two fixed conditions are satisfied, the impression of the well-rounded totality of this object and its rhythmical arrangement. This rhythmical arrangement depends, above all, with regard to single works of art, upon personal taste; it corresponds to the harmony of the psychic content of the individual soul, which varies widely with different persons: thus in poetry one person prefers dactyls; another, anapæsts. In the second place, however, this impression depends upon a socio-psychic moment, in as far as it expresses or fails to express the feelings of a given epoch. It is here a question of style. The real artist lives, however, in his style; and a work of art of any period of well-defined imaginative activity combines within itself socio-psychic and individual-

psychic *motifs* in such a manner that the former, as a result of evolutionary influences, is the first impression received. That is why a great artist who dominates the world of phenomena according to his own inborn rhythmic feeling develops fully only along certain lines of style. This style is possible only when the corresponding outer world of intellect has come to be dominated by certain fixed ideas whose nature is fully appreciated and understood.

As in the domain of imaginative activity, so also in the realm of merely intellectual problems, a central and unifying idea gains the ascendency. The shades and degrees of opinion entering into the compound of present-day thought, the total impressions of the preceding time, are now analyzed and classified. Causes and counter-causes are clearly separated, and one tries to bring about an accurate evolution of the contents of the whole; new phenomena are subordinated to a more complete world of ideas, and the latter, built up after the synthetic fashion, is crowned by a kind of collection of higher ideas from which men hope to gain a better outlook which shall bring a clearer

view of the world, an imaginable, metaphysical conclusion.

Finally, the compound of interests emerges from the state of vacillating, now thoughtless, now passionate, treatment to which they have hitherto been subjected; the difficult question of "either — or" is put more quickly to individuals, and decisions come about more rapidly.

And thus the whole psyche is set free, and — a centre of the total personality being created — regains its former self-mastery; it now seeks the highest pleasure of existence by proceeding, considering carefully what is possible, to the most energetic activity of its functions under the direction of a central *dominant*. There remains, as the fundamental condition of a regulated exercise of the vital powers, the new-won unity of psychic functions; and hence one may predict that a new period of idealism will open; that is to say, an idealism of the psychic authority of man over the outer world. In anticipation of this, every individual becomes in a high degree active and happy, feels a sense of pride in his creative powers, and therefore fortifies himself against negative reaction, against ennui, the perverse,

and all those forces which run counter to the highest human desire.

As we approach a new psychic condition, we enter upon a state of things decidedly unlike that which preceded dissociation, already described; indeed, an epoch is beginning — a world of new associations, stimuli, feelings, and ideals is preparing — which will bring a new era full of vital energy.

What will be its nature? This is a question which brings our investigation out of the isolation which has characterized it thus far, and which carries us on to the inquiry of the more general socio-psychic phenomena of the next lecture.

LECTURE IV

PSYCHOLOGY OF THE EPOCHS OF CULTURE IN GENERAL

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LET us recapitulate briefly the psychic processes outlined somewhat in detail in the last lecture.

We have seen how a vast amount of hitherto unknown, or at least unusual, stimuli forced themselves on the minds of men about 1850 to 1880. We have seen how difficult it was to these minds to grapple successfully with these new demands. The first stage began in a sort of coalescing of the new with the old. At least this was the case with a number of remarkable intellects. In the minds of larger groups a mixture of the new and old forces resulted: a certain sentimentality spread abroad; pessimistic, and at the same time humorous, tendencies developed abundantly. But a second stage introduced such a preponderance of new impressions that this complex attitude disappeared. All gave

way before the reënforced attack: men became one with their age. A dissociation of the usual groups of conceptions, an uncertainty of purpose and unsteadiness of will, indeed of the feelings in general, were the consequence. The *dominant* of the individual perished, and inner consciousness was given up to a hitherto unknown form of sensation, of imagination, of associations, and all their tendencies. Moreover, these unknown forms compared with the preceding were differentiated, and revealed in part provinces of the psychic existence which till then had remained concealed behind the threshold of consciousness. It was a time of the keenest excitement, which in the beginning took hold of but a part of the nation, and which was regarded as both sickly and nervous. But soon it was understood, together with the general stimuli conditioning it, in so far as these came out of the economic commercial and political life, to be universal; and finally also it was regarded as an unavoidable product of the process of development. And in place of the word "nervousness" there appeared a specific condition for which the definition "sensitivity" had

first to be made. But this transition, together with the recognition of it, was the expression of the fact that the social psyche of the time, that of the leading psychic life, was not willing to submit itself to this sensitivity in its naturalistic, dissociating effects. Or understanding the conditions, clearly or instinctively, the tendency was to resist and overcome it. The formation of a new psychic germ, of a new *dominant* of personality, began to grow under the new conditions of stimuli, association, tendencies, and emotions. The individual man came to the fore as master of his impressions; the idealistic period of a new psychic time began.

It is a process which in itself in the various stages of its individual course is certainly of the greatest interest. But it is not on this account that we have traced its primary psychic *motif* through its very network of muscle and sinews. It is of far greater interest that it is felt, on closer inspection, in this same network, as a systematic process in which the transitions of earlier periods of culture have merged. Therefore what has been revealed is the psychic mech-

anism of change in general from one age of culture to another.

Of course this is not meant in the sense that every phenomenon of the transition in the second half of the nineteenth century is a repetition with almost pedantic accuracy of all former transitions even to the smallest details. Rather, a more searching investigation yields as a result that occasionally a whole series of transitional phenomena fail to reappear, or at least are less emphasized. Moreover, if we cite not only German history for comparison, but take a survey of the transition processes of all other nations of west and middle European peoples, as also that of other groups of nations, for example the Japanese, we find certain differences which are, however, only variations such as one national type differs from another intellectually as well as in ideals and feeling. But apart from this, similar phenomena of psychic transitional mechanism reappear continually.

Let us trace this somewhat more carefully in German history. To begin with, the period of transition of the individualistic generations of the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries

up to the earlier subjectivism just after 1750 is exceedingly instructive. In this period, too, we notice an extraordinary augmentation of the stimuli and causes of association; above all, the rise of a new education of the generations who were recovering from the total collapse of culture during the Thirty Years' War, the increase of journals of all kinds since 1725, the appearance of a most extensive literature of ethnology and travel, and a thousand other events closely related to the new psychic stimuli. These incidents were accompanied by the early attempts of a triumphant and masterful union of old and new on the part of some leading spirits: Leibnitz, Händel, Bach, von Haller — as was also the case of the earlier spiritual culture of mingled feelings, — Pietism, Sentimentality. Then comes the outburst of the new, — Storm and Stress; loss of all *dominants*. But in the midst of this chaos the greatest minds find salvation by positively asserting their personality, as also in part by a well-developed hold on the earlier Hellenistic culture as taught by Kant, Schiller, Goethe, Beethoven. Yet it has long been known that these very men did not really

rule their age. The direct route of evolution was rather one of progressive dissociation in the so-called first stage of Romanticism. In later Romanticism came the reaction; the search for a new *dominant* begins. Then Idealistic philosophers come to the fore; science branches out into new syntheses; the great fight against Napoleon tightened the sinews of the will, and the personality of the first half of the nineteenth century comes into being.

With this the transition from one psychic period to another is completed; the further course of events next claims our attention, yet out and beyond the possibilities of observation in the present. Of this the characteristic is an increasing preponderance of intellectual will-power, properly so-called, the realism of the thirties and the political aspirations of the forties. And it ends in a degenerative imitation that revered the great masterpieces and simply sought to imitate and elaborate them. It bequeathed to us all the previous period had to offer, particularly in its early development, in as far as it furnished here and there instances of *dominants*. Therefore, at first, preponderance of inclinations, based on pure

reason and pure volition; contrasted with the enthusiastic divination and the vague aspirations of the early times, unquestionably the necessary symptoms of the complete development of a new *dominant;* following this, we note a certain barrenness and the gradual oncoming of lifelessness in the new and elaborately rounded state of affairs.

Let us go back farther into German history, and we shall find everywhere the same fundamental elements of a psychic mechanism, not only of the transition, but also of the course of separate periods of culture.

The immediate observation concerning these phenomena leads us to the period of the Reformation; to be historically accurate, into the centuries of Individualism (fifteenth to eighteenth centuries). And here we need only to call attention to a few stock phrases in order to show the existence of an essentially similar psychic mechanism. It is shown in the rise of finance, and with it, during the fourteenth to the middle of the sixteenth century, a vast expansion of the boundaries of time and space with an almost inexhaustible supply of new stimuli and associations; a dis-

turbance and disruption of the *dominants* of the mediæval world in the fifteenth century; a thousand petty isolated political and social revolutions, a hitherto unheard-of naturalism in imaginative activity, an increasing uncertainty of the emotional life, chiefly in the province of religious feeling; the rush to what was new, and the finding of a new *dominant* in the Reformation; the development of the vitality of will and reason in natural law and rationalistic religion, art, and poetry, and last the period closes in the epigon-like ideas of the Aufklärung.

But even if we go back still farther into the Middle Ages, or even the still more remote past, the same picture of psychic mechanism appears, except that here a twofold method of study agreeing with the double nature of the subject is necessary. First the religious factor prevails in the mass-psyche. In the individualistic period just noticed this phenomenon confronts us on every hand. It is still more the case, though the reasons for this may not be entered into here, in mediæval as in prehistoric times. A result of this religious bias is the marked one-

sidedness of the sources. At bottom we have exact knowledge of religious movements only; this defect is slightly remedied by the fact that religion was the very heart of all intellectual development. The second point is this: all comparative psychology is based on the comparison of foreign psychic life with the domestic. The disappointments of the comparison in general are smaller in proportion as the foreign psychic life somewhat resembles that of the individual. But where the resemblance is not easily detected, the danger of disappointment increases, and only very experienced master minds are partially protected from grave errors. In investigating the history of the Middle Ages, and still more of course of prehistoric times in Germany, the danger of falling into gross error is very great.

Yet in spite of these difficulties the psychic facts, at least of the Middle Ages, bear out the above claims so clearly that we do well to recall certain main features. And their testimony concerning our claim is decidedly in the affirmative; mighty changes of stimuli and confirmation of association, together with the rise of

nationality and the unity of the empire in the ninth and tenth centuries; complex feelings and dissociation of the most marked kind in the development of the piety of the tenth century; asceticism in Lothringia, and Cluny calling aloud for general reforms; the winning of a religious moral and intellectual *dominant* in the ecclesiastical and moral code of Gregory VII, and of those who built up this system; the voluntary application of this system to the methods of thought in the days of Innocent III; and finally the hopelessly pedantic intellectualism of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, all show the same course of events.

This, then, was the condition of things. The description of the phenomena of transition, as given in the preceding lecture, has laid bare the universal psychic mechanism of the course of the various periods of culture.

This result is in itself new; and we shall soon see to what important consequences it leads for the further development of the science of history. But is it a surprise to one well grounded in psychology, or even to one only acquainted with the main principles of the subject?

I hardly think so. Rather, the impression is that it could not possibly be otherwise. Besides, when the functions of socio-psychic mechanism within the courses of separate cultural periods are established as essentially similar, the question at once arises, in what, then, properly speaking, does the difference of the periods consist? This brings us back to the study of two kinds of factors: first, of that which is called the psychic *dominant;* and secondly, of that which may be denominated psychic scope, the extent of the possible phenomena in the psychic life of the individual as well as in things universal.

Let us explain first the meaning of psychic scope. We note at once the distinction between conscious and unconscious psychic life. It is an acknowledged fact that in every soul innumerable processes of sensation and reflection take place, without there being any clear or indeed even recognized consciousness to correspond to them. We know of their existence and their significance only from the feelings by which they are accompanied. And we may conclude from the close texture of these feelings, as also from other associated phenomena, that the sum

of these processes of unconscious psychic life is greater by far than the sum of the processes of that which is conscious.

Do there exist between conscious and unconscious psychic life hard and fast dividing lines? Experience teaches us the contrary. These divisions can, by close attention, be shifted, *i.e.* by the application of greater psychic force. As a result of this, the number increases; a change takes place in the quality of the feelings, concepts, and emotions. It is an experience that holds good as well for the single individual in the course of his existence, as for collective individuals, for communities of men; *i.e.* socio-psychic individuals with regard to their own transformation and their relations to other communities.

And since the moments of conscious psychic life in every psychic, normally developed being are continually on the increase, we distinguish in the province of this life two spheres, a narrow and a wider one. The wider includes those contents of consciousness which are often transformed into consciousness, and therefore under corresponding stimuli instinctively reappear in

these; the narrower circle includes those contents which first become conscious in consequence of specially directed attention, which may therefore be called contents of attention.

Therefore for both groups, that of the contents of consciousness and that of the contents of attention, it is an established fact that they grow with an increasing development of individual as of social psychic life, or, in other words, that in their development an augmenting psychic force is in operation; from the immense breadth of the psychic life, an increasingly large component part enters into the work centres, first of attention, then of the various kinds of consciousness.

But in another sense may we speak of a psychic scope?

There is a large number of underlying laws of psychic phenomena which carried to their ultimate conclusion would exclude one another, and therefore, in fact, are logically contradictory. The soul is stimulated on both sides by the world of phenomena outside of it and from out of its own inner life. And very often, if not always, there exists a difference between these

classes of stimuli. In the province of association, a given complex object may be treated as either unified or as isolated, dissolved, in the expression of the will; possibilities and counter-possibilities appear where there is visible a yearning for that which is antipathetic to our nature; the same is true in the domain of the feelings, above all, where contradiction of the positive and negative is evident. Accordingly it is conceivable that all psychic incidents in individual communities occur between polaric opposites. The condition of the individual, like that of the social psyche, is at all times variable; and the balance of the functions can easily be shifted from one pole to another.

We see, then, that in this sense, too, there exists a psychic scope; in contrast to that mentioned above, which can be characterized as breadth of consciousness, I should call it functional breadth of the soul. In what relations to each other do they now stand, historically considered — this breadth of consciousness and function? It is very evident that breadth of function is dependent on breadth of consciousness, for the latter, the more it increases, the more it shifts

the poles between which the functions act. Of course this is not saying that with increasing breadth of consciousness the functions of mind operate in increasing contrasts. Rather the breadth of functions which correspond to the new breadth of consciousness will be only gradually acquired. And the process in which it develops is, in psychic social relations, as may easily be divined, the transition process from one cultural age to another.

If from this it appears that the capacity for change of the psychic life in man as in a community is chiefly dependent on the breadth of consciousness, it is evident of what peculiar importance are those changes of stimuli and association, symptomatic as they are of psychic changes. The main question, however, which arises at this point is another. If changes in the breadth of consciousness take place, individual or socio-psychic, according to what principle are they worked out? The solution of this problem leads us farther along the lines of historical science.

Before we approach it, there is, however, another question to be dealt with by the way.

If the psyche, as phenomenon, undergoes an actual change, is it a question of constitutional modification that modifies at once the biological character of the soul, or is it only a change in the manifestation of the same unaltered biological type? As the following will show, the affirmation of the second alternative suffices for the establishment of the main facts of a psycho-historical science. But on principle, and in spite of the prevailing opinion, we decide for the first of the alternatives. According to all the analogies at our service we must assume that certain definite physical or physiological changes in the visible representation of the soul must correspond to a changing breadth of consciousness of the human psyche, such as are proved to be the case with individuals, especially in the gradual growth of the child's brain. But as investigations in this domain of science are still quite in their infancy, we are not justified in asserting from what has been said above that man, especially in his spiritual nature, has come to an absolute physiological standstill; this would constitute the most peculiar exception in historical development.

But to return to our main question. According to what principles do changes in the breadth of consciousness reach their consummation?

It is quite clear that in the psychic domain changes of an exclusively quantitative character do not take place. For all that is psychic is in its final, its most vital form of expression of a qualitative nature. Correspondingly the phenomena which appear, together with increasing breadth of consciousness, cannot be deduced by quantitative calculation. Or does any one really believe it possible to follow the increasing and shifting breadth of consciousness in the individual psychic life to the logical conclusion that every representative of an individual psychic life must be first a child, then youth or maid, then man or woman, ending with old age? It is a well-known fact that consequences and effects of the qualitative order cannot be deduced, that they must be experienced.

If we apply this experience to the socio-psychic solution of our question, we see how it at once resolves itself into a historical problem: the problem of deducing from the history of the

most important communities of men the evolution of the breadth of consciousness.[1]

This is the main problem of every scientific history of mankind. If its solution be attempted, the need of isolating the problem to certain peculiar cases is pressing; for only in this way is it possible to gain a proper mastery of the vast material to be investigated, and through this, real scientific progress. Isolated communities of particular importance, of relatively normal development, and easy access to the traditional sources bearing on them would have to be carefully studied in order to trace the course of psychic existence.

In view of these claims, the first thing is to limit the problem to the developments of national culture; for, indisputably, the nation is the most regular of all great communities of men. Among the national developments, those which,

[1] The qualitative difference of the character of this period can be easily shown. For, notably, every abstraction is rendered difficult, and in such a task as the one before us it becomes impossible, if the thing to be apperceived, and that from which the abstraction should be drawn, belong to one and the same qualitative continuum.

For the sequence of thought in the last paragraphs, cp. Lipps's "Guide to Psychology," p. 338.

in the light of history, offer the longest unbroken succession of culture epochs must be studied — nations for the exact investigation of whose evolution numerous and minute contemporary sources are available.

If one follows up these requirements, it will soon appear that, at least in the present condition of investigation, the history of contemporary nations of middle and western Europe is the first to be taken into consideration. And if one seek for the best subject among these, the choice will probably fall upon Germany. For which of the nations named could have made more of itself, wholly without the aid of the older Mediterranean civilization? And which of these nations could have been the basis of such a detailed account as is given in the "Germania" of Tacitus — the last great testimony of nearly two hundred years of Roman experience with the Germans! It was the expression of the views of the masters of the ancient world, of men who had the fullest knowledge of the men and nations of their time. Tacitus's "Germania" is both depot and reservoir of an exhaustive literature of Germany covering more than five

generations; it is, moreover, the work of an author who himself knew how to observe, as few before or after him did, — an international monument of the first order, which throws a surprising light on more than a thousand years of the past of Germany before and after the Christian era.

These are some of the reasons which have led me to make German history the starting-point for scientific historical investigation. But this is not in the sense that, when, twenty years ago, I planned a German history, I was clearly actuated by the above-mentioned reasons. In undertaking to write that work I was in part influenced by national enthusiasm, even though I quickly realized the universal, and particularly the methodological advantages of this choice; and if I emphasized the socio-psychic side, it was due to an instinct which, a quarter of a century ago, impelled me to analyze the historical evolution of nations according to their great periods of culture.

However that may be, on purely empiric lines, and not influenced by any sort of philosophical historical doctrines, there came about the classi-

fication of German history according to which my book is planned and which is about two-thirds finished.[1]

At best the idea of individualism, as Burckhardt developed it, for the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and as was here and there already manifest in existing literature, could have been drawn upon.

But if the course of the cultural periods of

[1] This classification, and the peculiar nature of my historical point of view, have been ascribed to all imaginable systems and modes of thought already in existence, particularly those of Comte. He who does his own thinking will only reserve a smile for such philological efforts. Human progress, and therefore history, does not advance on the lines of receptivity, permutation, and combination of that which already exists; and every sort of comparison is unmethodical and unscientific which is based not on socio-psychic, but rather on individual-psychic elements. For the individual-psychic is, in its origin, under all circumstances included in the socio-psychic of the era to which an individual belongs. Whoever desires to understand the growth of my opinions and their likeness to those of Comte (and this I do not deny) should first inquire what elements there are in the socio-psychic constellation of France in the first, and of Germany in the second, half of the nineteenth century so similar that they could give rise to similar views. I deny any sort of dependence, direct or indirect, on Comte, and should this still be insisted on, can furnish the proof for my opinions from a manuscript preserved by me dating from my student years; *i.e.* about the end of the seventies.

German history, as shown in the second lecture, be accepted without further question by those students who really see beneath the surface of things, — it is not accepted by writers of political history, for by admitting it they destroy the foundations of their intellectual existence, — there arises the further question whether this course of development can be shown to have been followed by other great communities, other nations.

It is clear at the outset that the answer can only be given empirically; that is, by means of the most extensive investigation of universal history. Such investigations have not yet been set on foot. Still, one is quite justified in maintaining that the history of the nations of antiquity, particularly of the Greeks, took just such a course as we might expect to find; the same thing seems to be true with the nations of western Europe, as also with the Japanese. The fact that these evolutions of peoples, so far separated from each other in time and space, prove that the processes of growth as seen among the Germans manifest the presence of a universal law.

And why should this not be the case? If throughout the periods of a symbolic typical, conventional, individual, and subjective psychic life, it can be proved that there exist certain underlying elements of still stronger forces which intensify and expand the psychic life, which deepen and strengthen national consciousness; if the course of things prove that following the early epochs came periods of, at first, slightly differentiated personality, in which the differentiation continued to grow, — then this final result corresponds to universally accepted experiences of history.

It cannot be expected, though, that in the normal growth of a people the stages of evolution should always be the same as those which have been found for Germany and published in my "German History." It is quite possible that in the early attempts at exact limitation of these culture epochs, a number of errors should creep in — errors which are not only excusable, but which must naturally be expected.

In the second lecture of this series I have endeavored to correct some such errors which I have detected in the "German History"

already referrred to. What is of much more importance is to recognize what is typical in each period in the stricter sense; this can always be done in any careful study of a national growth; the exact boundaries of these epochs cannot be deduced with absolute certainty. For, since in the setting up of certain types it is a question of comparison, there must clearly be, for the sake of certainty, at least two objects of comparison. Now the periods of culture described in my "German History" are not established with constant reference to the development of modern European and ancient Mediterranean nations, and later also to the development of Japan; there is a great difference between pressing forward by the help of a few guide-posts along one road to a fixed goal, and seeking the same goal by means of a number of similar and concentric roads. And hence there is no question that not all the real and perfect types of the periods, as set down in my book, have been traced out; but these can only be discovered and properly estimated after comparison of universal history with that of Germany has been made, and after more or less

accurate studies of the various nations have been made by rejection of the individual and particular, and by emphasizing moments common to all classes. By leaving out the individual and particular elements! Is the full meaning of these words clear to us?

Do we appreciate what an undertaking such a proposition presupposes? How many questions bearing not only upon history but also upon geography — in the widest sense of the word — are embraced in such a scheme? And what a part is played by the elements of race and the application of native endowments? But these are by no means the only difficulties. We must consider that almost every psychic process is capable of different solutions; *e.g.* such a simple fact as the reproduction of associations according to the principle of similarity permits of a thousand possibilities; that, according to the relation between the energy of the conceptions, and the intensity of the antithetic relations of unity, innumerable kinds of volition can be developed; that the height of psychic power, the gift for differentiating the stimuli and their after affects, and the capability of synthesis may be existent

in very different combinations, and can therefore produce entirely diverging forms of psychic life. Is it possible — one is constrained to ask — under such an infinitely varied influence, and coöperation of psychic forces, to suppose at all that certain fundamental traits can be common to the development of great human communities?

If we want to press the question thus raised, we must bear in mind that it is not our endeavor to maintain or to prove the identity of the development; the question only turns on similarity, on the relation of equality and non-equality. But how can I derive the sense of equality and non-equality between two or more objects? By attentively examining each of these objects by itself, not taking notice of its place and time, and by putting side by side the results of this examination of the single objects? Putting aside all idea of time and place! That would be equivalent to saying: In order that I may compare with absolute methodological certainty, I must take the single cultural periods of the different great human communities which correspond to each other

at first sight, without being obliged to consider either chronology or terrestrial localization.

If I do that, and if I study more closely the different eras, there arises at once the question whether amongst the millions and milliards of psychic processes, which are already included within one single era, there can be a single moment or ruling idea which is common to this age. As you know, this question is answered in the negative by the representatives of the school of political history, without their ever having troubled themselves, however, about the psychological or cosmic laws which are important for its solution, even without having given any thought to the culture-historical material which must be made use of if one would understand these problems of history. But if we do take into consideration all these questions, we obtain from the total material not only the idea of unity, historical and empirical, but also a general psychologic impression which absolutely declares and demands such a unity; all the simultaneous psychic incidents, the individual-psychic, as well as socio-psychic, have a tendency to approach common similarity.

The unity of psychic phenomena, embraced in the material for observation, in the separate psychic periods being thus indisputable, it may now be asked, according to what principles shall these different epochs be compared, as above described? I can either attempt the comparison of objects as a whole, or I can analyze the object into details, lay bare the elementary moments, and compare them with each other. The first kind of comparison is that of the older history of culture. There would result in this way, according to well-known psychological and epistomological laws, only vague similarities. Thus one might make brilliant generalization, based on such vague proofs of similarity, on the relation of the different ages; but this would be no exact proof of certain common traits.

If we would attain to this, it is necessary to choose the method indicated in the second place, that is to say, in our case, penetrate into the innermost constituent psychic elements of a given culture. That is what I have attempted in my characterization of the cultural ages of German history, and that is the new methodological feature of my work. Let us suppose that the

periods of culture now clear to us had stood the test, not merely — as is really the case — for German history, but also for the history of the other nations of the world; what should we have gained?

We should evidently have gained for the characterization of the single cultural ages and the similarity of their development a sum of empiric opinions which would be the product of a synthesis of all experiences which are of importance for it, and of all counter-causes which might have been brought forward against it, which, therefore, would be absolutely valid throughout the whole extent of available experience. And these opinions would not be based on one object that may have been investigated in a single spacial and temporal certainty, but on the full understanding of the whole, qualitatively defined. Judgments which have been tested by experience, and refer only to qualitatively well-defined objects, are called laws.

What we should have attained, then, is the proof of a regular course of the socio-psychological development within great communities of men.

It is a matter of fact, however, that the proof of the empiric validity required in the fixing of the different cultural epochs has not yet been furnished, though I no longer doubt, judging from examples taken at random, that this can be done by comparative investigations in universal history. Intensive work in special fields is required, and that means that much time and patient perseverance must be expended. Before this direct proof is produced — and I hope to be able to furnish some of it — there remains yet another means of assuring one's self of the probable result. It is that of a more detailed psychologic contemplation of the course of a single national-historical series of cultural ages.

The decisive moment from which we must proceed in such an undertaking is that of the psychic mechanism of the course of single culture-epochs. We must remember that herein two forces are operating side by side: the force of the world of phenomena, which continually provides new stimuli and possibilities of association, and the influence of the social psyche, to which those phenomena are always subordinated by separation (analysis) or by comprehension (synthesis).

What are now the mutual relations of these two forces?

At first the following opinion may be advanced. The actual governing power of the psyche, which we have called above the *dominant*, is a deception, after all — it does not exist. The possibilities which rest in the psyche of historical, that is to say, outer-psychic activity, include a wide field, let us say, the superficies of a sphere. Within this sphere now one segment, now another, is brought into the foreground of effect; this is caused by incitation from the world of phenomena, which determine the history of a certain time. The cause of this action, produced at different times, does not depend upon the socio-psyche, but upon accidental external stimuli. History is a kaleidoscope with a certain number of group-possibilities in elementary psychic phenomena, and the pictures included in these possibilities are produced now in this way, now in that, by merely exterior incitations. But there is, indeed, a certain centre in every picture for the individual spectator in consequence of his inborn or inculcated views which easily lead to the æsthetic manner of treatment

which we see illustrated again and again in European historiography; and there thus appears the animistic requirement of an impersonification of this centre, which again quite naturally lends importance to the idea of an actually governing *dominant.*

This way of looking at things, which would certainly be appropriate in the consideration of the psychic mechanics of one single cultural age, and which could hardly be rejected when restricted to so narrow a field of investigation, proves to be at once insufficient, as soon as we take up the study of subsequent cultural ages in any great community. For we see that, according to the unanimous verdict of all historical experience, those ages do not, by any means, succeed each other accidentally and without inner connection. They proceed rather within the line of a continual reënforcement or weakening of the psychic powers; they correspond to the development of an increasing or (in the times of decay) diminishing intensity of the general *dominant.*

Therefore this *dominant* is not the expression of socio-psychic forces, which have been stirred

from without, — the manometer, as it were, or the regulator of the steam generator, or of the steam engine, — but it is something for itself — something that carries a certain power of development, which by external influences may be especially increased or repressed, which, however, can never be changed in the development of its innermost character. If we stop here and look out in the psychic and physical world for analogies of this peculiar phenomenon, we see at once that it is by no means an isolated one. It is indeed with a general principle of biology that we have to do here.

The individual psyche, too, is not merely a surface over which associations, perceptions, feelings, and aspirations rapidly glide, but it is in the first place an ego. Not one of us is simply a product of the influences which act upon him. Yet every one claims to be an individuality, a character. And no plant or animal, no living being, can be explained, in its development through millions of years, solely by the influence of external causes; it has its inborn tendency of development, its own kind, and its special beauty.

It is evident that the question thus touched

upon leads immediately to the discussions of the evolutionary theorists, like Darwin. If the one-sided mechanical interpretation still prevails with them, a result of the mechanical development of the natural sciences for three and a half centuries and an instructive illustration of the psychic law of inertia, a similar mechanical interpolation of the psychic phenomena of life has enjoyed but a passing importance. It was the characteristic method of those years of modern naturalism in art and science which composed the period of transition to the last epoch in the history of civilization.

Just during those years of Darwinian supremacy, a high tide of new stimuli had almost totally enveloped the *dominants* of socio-psychic, and therewith also of individual psychic life, with, one may say, autonomous reactions upon the stimuli and with aspiration-relations; so that even experienced psychologists, except those who belonged to the school of experimental psychology, could hardly discover them. But we have passed this exceptional time and the individual psychic, and therewith also the socio-psychic *dominant* is recognized again.

If, however, the individual psychic, as well as the socio-psychic life, does not develop mechanically, but in the separation and differentiation of the psychic unity according to its laws, in consequence of continual growth (and final retrogression) of psychic power, then must the incidents of such a development be equivalent to the single evolutionary examples, in their innermost and elementary processes; and as the individual psyche runs through its specific development in the years of the child, of the adolescent, of the man, and of the aged, there must exist for the socio-psyche, too, a canon of development which runs through, in the unbroken succession, a series of cultural periods.

These are, considered from a fundamental and purely psychological standpoint, the elementary facts which may at present be laid down as the basis of cultural epochs in history. This scheme of the study of culture, though not yet established everywhere by adequate historical investigation, is, at least, as a result of well-tested qualities of psychic life, sufficient to rank as legitimate and authoritative. If this method is well grounded, and if we put aside the ques-

tion of its legitimacy, — it is denied by nobody, — then there arises a further difficulty, to which a particular, though perhaps exaggerated, interest attaches, — the question as to the relation of the individual to the cultural age in which he lives.

It is perfectly clear, though the recognition of this fact had to be forced from the majority of German historians after many hard struggles, that everybody is dependent upon the civilization in which he lives; that he is in this sense the child of his age. This holds good even for the greatest of men; and it is just they who have always recognized it, whilst the negation of this claim has always come from idealists whose conceptions of the past are most often wide of the mark. A remarkable condition of our day is the hero-worship of many of our historians; these are the most dangerous enemies of true historical science. Therefore the question is not, whether one is dependent upon his surroundings, but how great and of what kind it is.

If we now consider the peculiarities of high and low cultural periods, we find the general psychological proposition that the closer the

relations of unity between completed simultaneous events and partial events of psychic life, the more complete the psychic unification. As is well known, these relations of unity are in lower cultural periods much more intimate than in higher grades, because the individualization of the single persons, in consequence of a still inferior differentiation of the whole culture, has made but little progress; therefore the perception of these relations, by the single personality, is more uniform, or, expressed in other terms, the dependency of the individual upon his age is greater than in highly developed eras.

To proceed a step further and consider the highly developed eras, we must note in the first place that, in whatever form it may be, mostly perhaps in the advanced grading of their social classes, they bear in themselves the signs of a long past. Now the realization of this is, to be sure, often blunted, even obliterated from mind, or in its elements of feelings and aspirations, at least, strongly modified by the surrounding conditions; but the fact remains that this element weakens the psychic effect of the unity-relations, so that

a much greater personal breadth of psychic activity is given to the individual.

But, does one ask, in view of the foregoing facts, what is the difference in the individual psychic freedom attainable in the various cultural ages? We want to know whether all individuals are equally free, especially whether the heroes — the eminent individuals — are not totally free. The answer, however, cannot be simple. We must follow up more closely the difference between average and eminent individuals, and only then can the general answer be given: it will depend upon the difference thus discovered.

Difference between individuals! Is this not an inexhaustible theme? Does not the saying, *Individuum est ineffabile*, hold good here? No doubt: innumerable shades of distinctions, from the one pole of the enlightened, high-minded, and creative individual down to the darker world of the simple, the imitative, passive ones, can be remarked. But there must be, nevertheless, marked boundaries here as everywhere; for our thinking is subject to the economy of simplification. We speak especially of those who belong

to one of the above-mentioned poles of the average and of geniuses. And if we make these and similar differences, do we not proceed from the difference of the degree in which the single individuals are governed or not by the socio-psychic elements of their time? At any rate, we single out one group in particular, and maintain that it shows the least dependency on the socio-psychic elements of the time. This is the group of the great ones. What is, then, the condition of this class? If we approach the answer to the question thus given, a standpoint will naturally be gained for the solution of the problem, "Individual and Culture." The genius is the specifically creative individual. Every one agrees to this. But out of which psychic combination does this creative power come? It is not that, as Transcendentalists always maintain, a special power from heaven, a breath which is breathed by Elohim personally into these favored children of destiny after the general creation of human spirit has been completed. There is no fundamental difference, qualitatively considered, between heirs of other

souls, but only an exceptionally great psychic strength. This strength, however, may be portioned out in different ways; either harmoniously, so that all psychic qualities and accordingly often all physical qualities, appear to be enhanced, or unharmoniously, so that one or a few psychic qualities appear to be augmented at the cost of others. And according to this we distinguish harmonious and unharmonious geniuses.

But in our case it is not so much a question of individual capacity, but of the historical development of the same. And here this is evident: the unharmonious genius can attain to a high grade of effectiveness in transition times, for its psychic mechanism is favorable. On the other hand, the harmonious genius only excels in a uniformly developed culture. The effectiveness of genius is dependent on the socio-psychic constellation. What, on the other hand, is the case with the so-called "brilliant failures"? Here we may say, that neither can the unharmonious genius in a perfected culture, nor a harmonious genius in a time of transitional culture, find a field suited to his endeavors. Men of unharmonious genius are effective in a period

of transitional culture only when they are out of sympathy with the times; the harmonious genius is effective only when his general surroundings correspond to his nature.

In short, no matter where we look, the result is the same: the genius is enveloped by the period of culture to which he belongs, and he reaches his full perfection just in proportion as he is active among the developing tendencies of his time. These are dependent on the periodic development of the socio-psychic *dominant*. To give a concrete example, Prince Bismarck, one of the greatest of modern geniuses, laid it down as a law of life with him that *unda fert nec regitur*. And Bismarck's work was in a field usually supposed to be most subject to personal caprice. And so are we all, great and small, exposed in similar manner to the conditioning of socio-psychic forces, and a sort of servitude of the will runs all through our culture! Yet how false would be the general application of this melancholy conclusion! True we are in the midst of certain cultural conditions; we are parts of the socio-psyche of our time. At the same time we are parts of that directive force. And that

means that, viewed from individual-psychic or socio-psychic points of view, we are constituent parts of a complete organism. As with the individual, so also with every community of men, there is a great psychic tract, in which antipathetic conceptions, endeavors, and feelings may make themselves felt. By no means are individuals or societies cleverly devised books, but organisms made up of contradictions. But just as the psychic tract with the individual is not so extensive that it can include the experience of the complete sensations of old age in youth, or of youth in old age, not even in serious pathologic cases, so the psychic tract of a great society of men is not of such a nature that it can be made to receive the experience of reversed cultural periods. It is even rare that individuals of one epoch can so emancipate themselves as to be able to comprehend and absorb the essence of a past civilization.

But let us linger no longer here with details. Possibly in the future the elements of historical evolution bearing on the lines of thought just considered may be more accurately explained, perhaps, when the principles of psychology have

been applied to universal history. For the present the grouping of isolated events within the realm of psychic mechanics and the portrayal of certain parts of the processes of the evolution of single cultural periods are mainly problems of art, and not scientific analyses.

After this cursory review of the main outlines of a history of the various culture-epochs of the past, we turn with interest to that field of endeavor which to-day gives most promise for the future — the field of universal, not individual, restricted, history.

LECTURE V

PROBLEMS OF UNIVERSAL HISTORY

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Up to this point we have dealt with the periods of culture, with their general psychical character, with the psychic mechanism displayed in them, and with the way in which these epochs conform to certain laws which indicate the presence of a certain *dominant* which, supported by a constantly rising psychic force, tends toward an ever increasing soul-differentiation. Hitherto it has been a limited sphere of observation to which our thoughts have been confined: the study of the development of great communities of men, that is to say, of nations. And there was another limitation: the subject hinged exclusively on that normal national development which we observe in a nation when we follow it through its slow and uninterrupted growth-processes from the lower to the higher and highest stages of civilization. It is seen

that the point in question is a decidedly isolated one, — a condition which does not correspond entirely to the growth of the American nation, as it constantly unfolds itself before our astonished eyes, while the growth of the German nation, on the other hand, is probably the best example of the application of the principle under discussion.

It is clear that this limitation was necessary in order the more logically to deduce the principles aimed at. In regard to the difficulties of scientific problems we still keep to the old rule, *Divide et impera;* and, without making a definite and a conscious use of the isolating method, we should, in the most important questions bearing upon the science of history, fail to make real progress.

It is evident, however, that an isolating mode of speculation, though somewhat shut off from outer influences, — this can never be quite completely done, — opens the way toward deeper problems: modes of abstraction are but different ways of arriving at certain conclusions by means of given objects of study. But in our case the direct and self-evident relations between com-

munities of men demand of us to press forward toward an understanding of those relations. It could not be otherwise; every well-grounded view of human affairs must needs partake somewhat of the nature of universal history.

On entering now the limitless field of universal history, the speaker feels it incumbent upon him to declare that he does it with the greatest diffidence. Whoever thinks along historical lines and has a fair knowledge of some period of universal history, *e.g.* of the history of a single nation, will be overcome with a feeling of awe at the prodigious many-sidedness and endless significance of human activities. And as a result of this feeling, gentle stirrings of the mind are aroused, which take form in sacred admiration of the achievements of mankind; a noble yet dangerous devotion to the grandeur of the human race takes possession of us. If I take into consideration the course of German history, break it up into generations all the way back to the time of the heroic struggles of Arminius in the Augustan age, hardly sixty generations, who have been the makers of the historical life of the German nation as it is known to us, I can imagine my sixtieth ancestor

marching out with a German spear and looking with defiant mien across the Rhine, and my fiftieth ancestor putting behind him the great river and invading triumphantly the carefully guarded regions subject to the Roman yoke. From thence to my day there are but fifty pairs of hands, but fifty changes of blood. What have they not gone through, these generations, down to their remote grandson, who, accustomed to the air of close rooms, a brain-worker whose muscles have grown flabby from lack of constant exercise, has just crossed the vast ocean in order to speak to a foreign people, and yet in many respects to children of the same forefathers, of the life of his own nation during the course of the centuries! Let us imbue our minds with the feeling of this magnificent past, which is none the less concentrated in us, so as to be thoroughly sensible of its tremendous, and so to speak, "omnipotent force."

And yet, looked upon from the point of view of universal history, what are two thousand years, and what is the short life of a nation? May we not, in consideration of the historical eternity of past millenniums and millions of years,

apply to every nation, even to the most long-lived one, the sentence by which the psalmist expresses the transitoriness of the individual: "What is man, that thou art mindful of him?"

We cannot enter into problems of universal history, unless we do it with the earnestness of religious feeling, else the standard of the methods which may be used will be completely obsolete and consequently fail in the application.

From the examination of the different periods of culture and their connection, we are led on into the domain of universal history by the question: What are the external moments which, for the time being, cause a special accumulation and intensity of new stimuli, and which, in spite of a dissociation of the psychic functions, finally bring out in a nation an increased force of analysis and synthesis, a new form of the *dominant*, and with that a new period of culture?

The points thus brought into question are in the first place those of the inner development of human society. And they spring for the most part from political and economic evolution. Following now the rise of most of the great

periods of culture in German history, we may see that they correspond with the transition leading to domiciliation, to the exchange and barter of natural produce, to finance, and at last to the feverish economic conditions of to-day; and if we examine other national evolutions in the same way, we find in general a similar result.

At the same time we are struck by a moment, which, it is true, has already been described, but which must be emphasized once more: the transitions leading to new periods of culture which often succeed changes in economic and social life. The economic life of any period of culture manifests a decided similarity to the instinctive and impulsive actions of single individuals; it seems that the bulk of all economic actions become mechanical, and because of constant repetition assume the form of a sort of social autonomy. As compared with the higher intellectual life, economic activity bears in many respects the stamp of the vegetative, at least after certain general habits have been developed and so long as these are adhered to. But what results when, because of certain inner changes,

particularly of the overgrowth of some departments of industry, sharp changes set in? In this case a great many customs which had become automatic will be subjected to a new socio-psychic analysis; if actual disturbance takes place, then feelings and aspiration make themselves known, which, in part, vitalize and bring about dissociation. It is a process which, looked upon from the point of view of individual psychology, has its exact counterpart; this process explains how periods of economic changes easily become the starting-point for the higher psychic changes, the more so when they are accompanied by social upheavals. For where has there been an economic revolution without the resulting social readjustment?

All that has been said explains how economic and social changes become and ought to become general-psychic transitions; but it does not explain why, according to all known historical experience, there are connected with some of these economic revolutions certain psychic changes which are always the same, — why, for instance, the rise of finance is regularly connected with the transition to individualism.

And there is another thing to be taken into consideration. An economic revolution not only creates a psychic dissociation, but, corresponding to its special character and at the same time intensifying the dissociation, produces in every instance numbers of new specific stimuli and germinations of associations. New conditions of will and purpose, changes of sentiment, and so forth set in which tend to modify decidedly the higher forms of intellectual life. It would be a study of great value to establish, by comparative work in universal history, what are the constantly recurring economic factors of each period which are so uniformly followed by the development of other higher intellectual values.

We cannot enter upon such an examination at this time. It is sufficient in this connection to recall, from what has been said, that in the inner national development the psychic values of new periods of culture come into existence as a rule along with economic and social changes.

We see that this is the doctrine of Karl Marx, the theory of the so-called, though most unhappily so-called, historical materialism.

But does it give a sufficient explanation of all the phenomena, or even of all the inner phenomena, of socio-psychic progress? Not at all. In German history we have a most instructive example of progress toward a new period, the transition to subjectivism of about 1750, when an explanation based on socio-economic causes — though these elements enter into the count — is entirely unsatisfactory. In this case mental and moral forces played an important rôle. And why should not this be true? These elements: the development of the new ideals of education, at first of the "*homme du monde*," then of the "well-bred"; the increase of interest in everything printed, the development of an incredibly productive journalistic and newspaper literature; the possibility of an ever widening circle of friendship due to the newly won leisure; the growth of a vast literature of ethnology and travel; the expansion of men's idea of time and space due to travel and exploration, — all these forces entered into the sum of influences which compelled the change.

Consequently the doctrine of Marx and his

school is utterly inadequate even if we attempt to measure the mental and moral progress of a community. But it would, of course, be going too far simply to deny the great importance of their theory. And it is quite clear that, from the steady development of the national *dominant* and especially from the incidents of economic growth, material and hence social progress is the basal motive of general advance. All other causes are incidental and remain nothing but very important exceptions to the rule: that thus a nation, which would develop when isolated only out of itself, would chiefly be an example of the correctness of Marx's theory, which we can of course acknowledge only within certain limits.

But where shall we find an isolated nation? It is one of the characteristics of the socialists' doctrines that, conscious or unconscious of it, they have looked upon the people in this sense. This has been the case in Germany from Fichte to Marx, and from Thünen to Rodbertus.

But, historically speaking, no nation is thus isolated. On the contrary, as far as we can penetrate into the mist of the remote past, all communities of men, great and small, are, partly

in a hostile, partly in a friendly way, closely associated with their neighbors. And thus it is evident that the scheme of development as hitherto discussed will remain the same, but that a thousand other motives may still be woven into this firm canvas of the past, — motives of advance, of recession, of highest acceleration, and of destruction.

If we would understand thoroughly the operation of these elements each by itself, they must first be minutely characterized.

I do not refer here so much to the influence of external occurrences, of sudden changes of environment, of earthquakes, inundations, landslides, and the like, or even of subjugation and of political, sometimes even bodily, destruction by a human foe. They have of course most effectually determined the fate of the different nations; and what bard of ancient times, what political historian of to-day, would let slip the opportunity of describing these epochs and catastrophes? But viewed from the standpoint of the psychology of history, such convulsions mean no more than, from the physiological point of view, is meant by staggers, tuberculosis,

and other diseases of cattle. They destroy certain socio-psychic individuals, at most whole nations, and at least thwart and limit them in their full development. From the point of view of historical evolution in its typical sense, they signify nothing; and they regain their importance only when we attempt minutely to describe that particular part of the great world known to us, not so much when we try to comprehend it in broad outline.

Of far greater importance for our purposes are those examples of universal inter-relation which have been given us in the projection by one community of men upon another of their ideals and methods, so that a permanent change takes place. Therefore it is of importance to determine on what conditions and in what forms such influences are actually exerted.

We have here to deal with two things: the ways in which those influences are brought to bear upon other peoples, and the form they assume. The first point leads to the study of the history of the inter-relations of communities of men, and thus to a field of exceedingly different possibilities, to classify and to understand

which is at least one of the greatest tasks of universal history. As regards the second point, however, a double division seems not to be out of place. The form of the transmission of influence can either be men themselves or any human products. We have an example of the first instance, cited above, in the wandering of the nations, at least in so far as it left two or more peoples dwelling permanently together; the second is indicated by the transference tools, inventions of all kinds, and especially through purely intellectual values such as monuments, language, and writings (hieroglyphics, alphabetical writings, musical notation, etc.). So it may pass for a law, that at all times the elements of that culture which is more instinctive and apparently more constituent, especially those things which apply to the economic and social life, have been more difficult to transfer, the means not being so readily at hand. From this it follows that the course of universal history has taken the direction in which the transmission of the higher elements of culture was easiest.

But is it possible to systematize, by following certain mathematical formulas, the numerous

combinations and permutations of the imaginable ways and forms of transmission, and take a quick survey of them as a system? Hardly. Only a full and broad experience will enable us to see clearly the essentials of the problem, and then only a very simple and elementary survey of the process of transmission may, as I suppose, be gained. Research in this field, in so far as it relates to the point of view already indicated, has only begun; for the greater part is but the description of the outer appearance of things, without even an endeavor to picture the real inner, underlying life. The way of mediation may lead either through space or time, and in the first case we might speak of receptivity, in the second of renaissance. The means of mediation may be single or manifold, intermittent, continuous, one-sided, lying open only to the initiative of the one community in question, or two-sided, — distinctions which occasionally may be traced to special climatic and geographic conditions as well as special culture-differences. And according to this we shall be able, when using the picture of a well-known psychic process, to speak with reference to these processes of

osmotic phenomena of diosmosis, endosmosis, and exosmosis. But as regards the instruments of transmission, the most important distinction seems to be the one between short and long duration. To those of short duration belongs the individual; to those of long duration, the race and the art of writing. Upon those of long duration is founded the possibility of an at least partial revival of an already extinct culture, hence renaissance of every sort, — one of the most remarkable phenomena of human development.

It is evident that thus far everything else rather than a theory of the ways and means by which universal history is "made" has been discussed; it suffices, however, if the main problems in question have been in some measure touched upon. How very much is there still to be done in this line; how the gold nuggets, as it were, of great scientific discoveries lie in the streets ready for every one who will but pick them up!

But this brings us little further on our way except that perhaps the problem lends itself more readily to solution when its kindred

themes have been cleared up. We may inquire as to the effect of the extension of space, measure of time, and for the possible psychic results of the transmission of older ideas to younger peoples. These questions are in some measure already answered by what has been said; at the same time general-psychic knowledge helps us, at least in part, to obtain a correct formulation of the problems under consideration. In regard to the expansion of culture-ideas through space, it seems that for an isolated influence there is no limit to its territory, though really it is, as a rule, subject to the field of activity in which it has existence.

If this proposition bears the impress of the self-evident, it is nevertheless worthy of remark that it has also proven to be right, where the question is one of the transference of complete sums of objects, even of whole cultures. But these influences do not permeate the whole new community, but only those members of it who have special relations to them or enter into special connection with them. And, indeed, that holds good for periods of receptiveness as well as renaissances. For instance, the reception

by other European cultures of the chivalric ideals of the twelfth century of the North of France and Provence presupposed the existence of knighthood, with its economic and political basis, or at least germs of the same; and the different revivals of the classics were only possible where there was a certain admiration for ancient civilization, which admiration was either taught the people by a great monarch or by intellectual leaders who looked up to the ancients or who fancied that they were re-living the life of antiquity.

These are but a few cursory observations on the space-question, — also the sociological problem which requires attention here might be supposed to be closely associated with that of space, — observations which come to mind in any study of the elements of civilization which one age inherits from its predecessors; how much clearer, how much more important for the proper estimate of the individual case, would be the picture of that question of space, if it could but comprise the experiences of the whole of known human history.

Just as important, and perhaps of still greater

consequence for the general knowledge of the psychic agency in the course of history, is the consideration of the time-measure of the influences of inheritance. And it seems almost without exception that this measure of time, tested by the time-measure of the inner process of the evolution of the receptive human community, appears to have been quickened. Frequently we get the impression that there has been a complete overthrow of certain cultures; judging by this impression, we might indicate the general psychic effect of the inner processes of development as continuous, while that of transmissions might be termed catastrophic. The explanation of this distinction has already been made possible by what has already been said to-day, at least as far as the more universal transmissions are concerned. The latter are either enforced, and in this case they are introduced by compulsion, that is at an increased rate; or they are spontaneous, and in this case they only develop themselves when the receiving community desires them fervently, consequently again at an increased rate. We may be certain from what has been shown that, social temperaments being for the moment

considered the same, among several human communities, the time-element of that community will be shortest which accepts the greatest amount of foreign influences. This is an observation which explains a great deal in Greek history when we compare it with the fates of later nations, as for instance of the French.

But those considerations lead us to the threshold of another difficulty, namely, the question of what the effect, the psychic effect, of transmissions on the receiving community is. And our starting-point is a few elementary laws of psychology, especially those of association. The law of analogy is the first that engages our attention: in every mental and moral process there is a tendency to find in active life similar processes. Again, we have the law of association of experiences:[1] if one mental incident coincides with another or joins immediately with a preceding one, they become a totality or a completed process, in such a manner that the recurrence of one part of this totality brings the recurrence of the whole. Besides these laws another one must be mentioned: mental impres-

[1] Von Lipps' theory: "Psychology," p. 44.

sions are not strongest when the contrast between receptivity and the force of impression is greatest, but when the contrast is intermediate, so that the power of impression and weak receptivity are not isolated and thereby repelled. The result thus far of our observations is easily derived: where the ways and means of transference bring to a community not only single moments, but the bulk of a foreign culture, the tendency arises to adopt not only the single, but also the whole of this culture and to blend it with one's own culture. And secondly, this tendency to assimilation only becomes effective on condition that the foreign culture, compared with the indigenous culture, does not show too sharp distinctions of the psychic force, and thus destroy the equilibrium of the two cultures.

Both these conclusions are fully confirmed by all well-established historical facts. It is one of the best-known historical phenomena that nations in very low stages of culture are ruined by the importation of very high cultures, and that nations of a high culture adopt with difficulty even single elements of lower cultures. It need hardly be mentioned of how great and universal

significance these facts are: the first reveals the general law of productive universal-historic combination; the second shows how far within this combination the inner socio-psychic development of the single-historic community, that is to say, the succession of the periods of culture, is preserved. Hence the result is a universal-historical connection, modified only by a succession of typical developments of great communities.

Having got the result, it is possible to say something more exact and yet general about the more intimate psychic effect of foreign influences in human communities. The decisive question is, of course, in what proportion those transmissions are to the inner-psychic mechanism of the periods of culture. The principle of proportion is already established by the simple conclusions, which have just been drawn from universal-individual, as also from socio-psychic, laws: this mechanism, dependent very much on the succession of the periods of culture, may suffer slight variations and derivations, especially an intensification of their tendencies; but abrogated they will never be. It is the same with the external influences on one human life; they can certainly be of great

importance, but it is beyond their power to remove all that psychic mechanism which leads from the spiritual life of the youth to that of manhood and hence to old age.

In general we can derive by way of psychology the fact — and experience confirms this derivation — that outer socio-psychic influences of an opposing tendency to those within at one time tending toward dissociation, at another toward concentration of the native forces, in the psychic mechanism, will remain without decided effect; their influence is, naturally, much greater when they are applied along the lines of the natural-psychic mechanism. Dissociation of existing mental and moral conditions tends to produce change from one to another period of culture. Of how great importance for the development of European individualism was the Roman Renaissance of the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries, and how important was the Hellenic revival of the eighteenth century for the rise of German subjectivism!

But the application of external influences is of the greatest importance, not only on the efficients of dissociation, but also for those of concentra-

tion when the psychical mechanism runs a parallel course. These influences do not enter largely into the analysis of the new moral elements, which are stirred up by the operation of a great number of new stimuli in the socio-psyche; the struggle for the growth of a new *dominant*, which takes place here in its profoundest and most productive forms, is chiefly supported out of the means and forces of the innate and intensive development. And it seems as if it depended on this connection and on still more profoundly working factors, that the underlying basis of the *dominant* once given cannot be removed by external influences. But in this domain a clarifying influence which operates on the established order of development does not seem to be excluded; *e.g.* the process within the Franconian and Carolingian ornamentation, which led to a somewhat naturalistic conception of the (animal) objects reproduced, a process characteristic of the transition to the symbolism of the Middle Ages, was supported by the purifying influences of antique ornamentation.

It will thus be seen that the time required for the development of the inner socio-psychic

is decidedly shortened by the intrusion of foreign influences.

But external influences, it appears, tend synthetically to build up rather than to dissolve the various elements of a community in the form of a new *dominant;* certain parts and even whole psychic characters of former cultural epochs, if their spirit be in harmony with the principles of the new *dominant,* take on, as it were, new life. In consequence of the influx of strong foreign influences, a sort of socio-psychic indigestion is produced, and great historiographic art is required to describe accurately such a condition, with its complications and tendencies, so that the reader may really enter into the spirit of the time. If this process of change is complete, a new social psyche appears, bearing the signs and the marks of older or foreign generations.

This is an important and in a special sense a universal-historical process; important traits of influential characters of the past are thus reproduced in present-day life; the new combination contains whatever is immortal in human affairs.

This is a phenomenon which invites us once

more to study the characters of the great men, heroes of history. Are they not, also, bearers of influences, which, since they are individual, present to the new social psyche a half-foreign appearance? Must not the influence of these men upon a present-day culture be subjected to a similar analysis to that which was applied to the more general foreign influence? Only in the course of this analysis the position of the individuals is quite different. And thus it will be true for them, too, that whatever they have contributed of their own natures to the community is immortal and continues to live in the historical influences of this community on the socio-psyches of other times and places.

But let us pause a moment. Is there a fundamental difference between the psyche of the hero and that of the lowest member of a community, one who toils at his humble task and is perhaps only capable of physical exertion? No: we are all men alike, and there is in each of us a creative spark, even if it be only that of imitation, and only with the results of this talent do we enter into the everlasting history of our race.

But it is time that we draw from these gen-

eral observations certain conclusions as to the way history ought to be studied and taught. Let us accept the general explanation given above, in so far as this has been shown to be well grounded, leaving out all that rests only on probability.

The full historical comprehension of a single change or of a single phenomenon, with their historical significance, can only be acquired from the most general principles, that is to say, from the application of the highest universal-historical categories. These, however, are all summed up in the one great truth, that the general historical moment, the meaning of the unity of history, is not to be looked for so much in the apparently important historical events in these occurrences, whose transmission through time and space is checked by the difficulty of unknown ways and unprepared forms, but in the liquid, as it were, ethereal elements which are destined to influence universal history through long periods of time. These are the products of the higher intellectual activity, moral and religious principles, art, poetry, and science; these are the influences which become the chief constituents in the great stream of world history. Along with these,

though of secondary importance, must be classed political history, social and economic conditions and activities.

The consequence is, as every single historical event must be valued according to these highest principles, that special history, the history of individual nations, must not be valued and appraised according to the canons of economic, social, or constitutional history, but according to the standards of the highest intellectual attainments, else it would never appear what individual peoples have stood for or still represent in universal history. Hence a theory of the character and the course of a cultural age must not be based (even if the conviction were firmly fixed that this character and course were correctly defined by economic and socio-political moments) on the history of economic conditions and of society as fundamental permutations; but, on the contrary, its principles of classification must be dependent on the highest intellectual life. Cultural ages must be defined and arranged, not by the nature of the roots of things, but by their fruitage. It is the more necessary to reform our methods in this because, according to the earlier

view, the analysis of the history of a people is apt to do violence to the principle of intimate connection between the very beginnings of a particular civilization and its later flower and fruit. Within the highest psychic life, the facts and incidents in the domain of purely imaginative activity, say of poetry, music, and especially of plastic art, seem to lend themselves most readily for use in the marking off of the boundaries of particular periods. The reasons, both practical and theoretical, of this we shall discuss presently. In accordance with these principles, that positive doctrine of the cultural ages, which I have now for the first time deduced, is constructed; the application of these ideas has been made in my "German History."

But is this the end of it? Not in the least. I have already indicated wherein lies the deficiency. A careful revision must be made, the results of the study of other national growths as well as the discoveries in one's own national history must be assimilated and digested. A sort of subjection to the laws found to apply to other peoples must be acknowledged; for it has been found that the succession of the stages of the

history of one nation is the same for all other nations. Yet there is no kind of doubt that, according to the nature of the new method as well as because of the condition of things, these principles of classification are more German than otherwise, and that the final method must be made more universal.

An infinite amount of work has still to be done, a work which shall seize upon that which is of importance for universal history in the growth of the various states and set it forth in its true colors. Such an undertaking, if truly accomplished, would be free from all bias, all restraint such as is ordinarily imposed by one's former views of what ought to have been the ruling moments in the history of the several peoples.

But a further problem, and a difficult one too, must be met by way of preparation for such a work. Are the cultural ages, hitherto discovered and applied in German history, all that exist and all that the intelligent student might look for? Do they embrace the whole field from the beginning to the end?

The question must be answered in the negative.

As to the future, we Germans hope (and justification of this hope may be found in Roman history) that the number of the culture-epochs is not yet exhausted. To complete the cycle which seems to have been the rule in other civilizations, still other epochs are required. If this is true, a great field of effort lies ahead of us, a field which might be called that of historical science interpreter, as it were, of over-ripe cultures; to be able to work in this domain one must study carefully the Roman, the Indian, and the Chinese cultures. Still, all this must not be considered as being all-important. First, because one likes best to study those cultures of the past whose typical forms clear up more satisfactorily the development and present condition of the great states of to-day. And again, because decadent cultures — and those mentioned above are certainly to be regarded thus — can be understood only when their earliest stages of development lie open before us. And just these lowest stages are those about which we know the least in all these instances, and therefore those which require most accurate description and interpretation, for the reason that the later periods of

national growth present a decidedly different picture from that of their earlier stages; and it is the study of both pictures which, perhaps more than any other, clears up the inner *motifs* of the decadence.

Thus, if we would fill out the cycle of culture-epochs, as our study of German history suggests, we must turn our attention backward to the beginnings of recorded history, and if we apply here the canons of modern historical science, considering at the same time the inter-relations of the various branches of the subject, we shall find two conditions which require attention:—

1. German history reaches back into an age which we may call at first sight that of ethnological culture; it is well known that for the conditions of the old Germans, as we know them from Cæsar and Tacitus, we find numerous parallels in present conditions of people of so-called lower culture, as, *e.g.*, the Kaffirs, or, to mention an American Indian tribe, the Tlinkits. 2. The question of finding still other cultural ages, further removed from us than those at present known to German history, is therefore identical with the task of discovering from the enormous

materials of modern ethnology whether degrees of psychic development of such a nature exist as to permit existing material to be embodied with them, without doing violence to established principles of classification. And the answer to this question would signify, as can easily be seen, the harmonizing of history and ethnology and at the same time the classification of the lower peoples now living, and their arrangement in their proper place in the course of universal history, which would again signify the full development of an ordered science of world-history. We see from what has been deduced how important is the problem which has just been stated. But how can it be solved?

Any amount of investigation of the conditions of early social life, of family and clan organizations, would fail to give an adequate basis for the formulation of the principles of a history of lower cultures. Indeed, to understand these, one must take the same point of departure as for higher cultures: the highest functions of psychic life are those which must be investigated.

But among these one has particularly to be singled out in order that we may clearly com-

prehend all its psychological bearings. This is imaginative activity. The imagination is that special psychological function in which new thought-unities take their origin, that is, the beginning of both synthetic concepts, which again come into existence only after the breaking-up process of analysis. In these changes we also first mark the appearance of a new *dominant*. Therefore it has become possible to say of the single individual,[1] "The tendency of the imagination shows in the most direct manner what experiences and associations have gained the upper hand, and thus what sort of a character he is." But what has been said here of the individual-psychic being may be applied quite as appropriately to the socio-psychic being.

If thus the question about the enumeration of the periods of low culture — or, what is the same thing, the problem of the analysis of the vast ethnological material on the line of historic categories — is reduced to an inquiry concerning imaginative activity, it will be found that we must rely mainly on the plastic arts. A brief review of the materials of ethnography seems to

[1] Von Lipps, p. 126.

be necessary at this point. The requirements, both practical and scientific, demand in this review a consideration only of those parts of the vast material which are subject to the fewest exceptions, and analogous elements which characterize the growth and development of all peoples at certain stages of their existence. We must also take examples of imaginative activities which are not modified so positively by the influence of the various languages. Otherwise, how would it be possible, with our limited means, to carry out the comparison? Such examples, however, are only to be found in the field of art.

The history of art furnishes us with the examples with which to make our comparisons. And there are still other practical reasons for studying these subjects. As is known, we cannot, from the general ethnological material, divide off a historic section or subdivision, because the material, considered from the universal-historical point of view, is wanting in the first of all necessary elements, that is to say in chronology, either absolute or relative. Historically we know too little of the nations, whose cultural possessions are shown in our museums, to be able to dis-

tinguish easily between the products of each nation which come from older times and those which were added from later or neighboring peoples.

The spade and pickaxe are our main reliance in the study of prehistoric times. Archæology is concerned chiefly with civilization in its lower stages; but while looking for the signs of primitive culture in the earth, we also find in these hidden records, as they are laid bare to our view, the necessary facts for the establishment — though sometimes none too securely — of a new chronology reaching into far remote ages of the past. Thus earlier and later culture-epochs are clearly traced within the limits of ages hitherto regarded as beyond the reach of modern investigation. By the terms "earlier" and "later" it is not meant that our knowledge of prehistoric nations covers their whole civilization. It is well known, indeed, that all the work done at the various localities in the East only brings to light certain classes of monuments — those done in the most durable of materials and those which have been in some way protected against the forces of dis-

integration. Besides, all that has come to light thus far deals almost exclusively with the artistic side of life, with plastic art in particular.

This is for us the salient point. If we look backward, we find the chronology necessary for the historical analysis of ethnological data can only be drawn from prehistoric times; but the latter furnish satisfactory materials only for plastic art. The chronology of this material, however, even if it were of a nature to extend our knowledge of the other branches of prehistoric activity, could be applied only to that of plastic art. And finally: if all the data for all branches existed both in archæology and ethnology, and if all the languages of the different nations could be mastered equally well by one and the same investigator, we should still be able, on account of the vastness of the material, to make only a beginning, and this beginning would, because of general psychological laws, be in the field of imaginative effort. So we should have finally to do first just what our materials now enable us to do intelligently — judge the past through its artistic side.

Again all roads lead to Rome. So much the

better if only this seeming unity enables us to solve our problem the more readily. But this requires a systematic working-through of all the monuments of northern, middle, and southern Europe, along with those of the eastern Mediterranean and Asia Minor. This will give rise to comparative study of the various peoples along the lines of their development — chiefly as expressed in the various forms of art. If it appears that all these civilizations have advanced along parallel lines, — which seems highly probable, — then shall we have a canon of history which may be applied to the other ethnographic groups. When this has been accomplished, we may estimate the importance to world-history of each individual community or nation. A scientific *Weltgeschichte* can then be written.

Such a universal history remains, of course, the final aim and end of all historical science. And it can be attained in no other way than by the application of scientific method and experiment, however much the imagination would like to hurry by way of transcendentalism toward general results and easy solutions. Hence there is all

the more reason to emphasize empirical and methodical efforts to reach a true answer. But this can only be attained (and this, not the materials of knowledge, is our goal to-day) when we approach the subjects in question entirely free from prejudice. How long has it been since the day when tradition restricted one to the written sources! And even to-day a similar opinion comes occasionally to the surface — a notion which belongs only to the past of historical science. It has been seen what an extraordinary importance now attaches to the investigation of prehistoric times, a field of activity so much despised a few decades ago. And looked at from a methodological point of view, is not a monument, which personifies a portion of the past, to be far more highly prized from the epistomological point of view than the story of any occurrences indirectly, and perhaps incorrectly, related? And has not every prehistoric monument which takes a prominent place in the history of fine arts a greater documental value in proportion as it fixes, not only one moment of a past important action, but all moments of it?

We must be cautious, but also intellectually free, in the rarefied air of the problems of universal history.

It is, however, time to face the last but not least important phase of the subject. Do the examples dealt with really embrace all the problems of universal history? Are there not other and more difficult ones?

This must be unreservedly answered in the affirmative. Indeed, all the questions in point here, within certain limits, refer to suppositions, which are simplified by isolation. These suppositions, intentionally formulated somewhat too strongly, are: the national course of human history, and the normal course of national developments. Has history, as far as we are able to observe it, really taken its course in normal, — that is to say, from the beginnings to the very perfection of individual development, — progressive national cultures? Or has this occurred only in certain arbitrarily chosen examples? It is as if one would require that a forest should consist only of trees which had gone through the whole process of growth, from the very beginning to their final decay — *i.e.* the course of a

normal tree. But there are trees which are propagated by grafts and from shoots; and then not every tree comes to its full maturity. It is not different in the life of a community. Indeed, the example of the tree and the wood teaches us how fitting and necessary is the method of isolating things. What would plant biology have amounted to if one had been required to study each individual plant rather than the normal, typical growth?

But it is an established fact that the course of universal history can by no means be determined, or even described, by means of the principle of special individualist research, in so far as I am acquainted with this class of writing. It seems a matter of course that we should only follow up in the most careful manner the vast subject, and that we cannot reconstrue it and draw conclusions of any kind from it after the manner of logical deduction. In the course of our observations, certain great complications have not received due notice, though in a general way they have not been excluded from the schemes laid down. In this class belong certain

parts of every migration of nations and of every colonizing movement.

This is a point which it is certainly worth while to touch on here, in the historic metropolitan seaport of the New World. What is it that makes the history of the United States one of the most interesting subjects for every historian? I think it is the fact that on the same ground two interesting psychic currents of general significance have crossed and are still crossing each other: the incidents of psychic revolution of such national elements as one finds in national migration, and such as undergo at the same time that peculiar change of the national character which is always connected with the appearance of colonizing movements. The inhabitants of the German empire of today are, in their ideals of culture, of a twofold habit of mind: according as they belong to the old native country, which is situated westward from the Elbe and which they have occupied for at least fifteen hundred years, or to those colonial territories, eastward from the Elbe, which were wrested from the Slavonic inhabitants only five hundred years ago. We Germans

understand very well the distinction between the Berlin and the Cologne types, between the young squire from the country east of the Elbe and the manufacturer of the West — between Prussia, the Eastern State, and the other States; it is the distinction of the plucky, more energetic disposition, with a natural bent to rule, and the more yielding, indolent class — the distinction between the colonial and indigenous character. It is the same distinction that exists between the Englishman and the American, indigenous and colonial Anglo-Saxons, a fundamental distinction for American history. For the original Irishman, German, Swede, Roman, Slav, becomes in the United States a colonial.

But this is not all. For the culture of this great country and its people the principles of psychic transformation of the migration of nations hold good. Here, on colonial soil, nation stands beside nation, though the Anglo-Saxons are in the ascendency, and they all act and react upon each other. This is a process which again modifies the national character, already strongly differentiated from the original by colonial conditions. These influences, reënforced by

geographical and political forces, will continue until new common purposes and ideals are attained.

This process is being worked out in the very light of history; and thousands of sources, foreign relations, the constitution, social growth and change, poetry, all speak out and prophesy concerning things present and to come. What a wonderful task for a historian to follow up these psychic changes, these innumerable combinations and decompositions, and to project from them the picture of a great and united future! This idea cannot be even outlined in the short space of a lecture on the general character of universal history. Could this undertaking even be carried to perfection without clear notions of the general principles of which we have been speaking, and is not an understanding of American history and conditions a problem of world-history?

Vast and inexhaustible are the sources of universal history. Whoever tries to survey it will certainly shrink back in the very beginning from the task of bringing all its treasures together and from attempting to sort them all for

himself, especially if he but pause to think how little men know of their past, to say nothing of their ancestry. How we labor and puzzle ourselves, trying to find out how and when the human race came into existence! Herder's idea was that God separated all human kind from the rest of animate nature and breathed into them the spirit of reason,—the greatest act of the whole process of creation. How many millions of years may have passed since man began to separate himself from other organic life of which he was to become the master. And how many ages have passed into that eternity which separates us from man's first attempt to approach with timid steps (from stimulus or association) the beginnings of that extremely complicated subject: evolution, which has become for us the very basis of our thought.

Of all these millenniums we know but ten thousand years. And yet we try to penetrate into the very birth-chamber of human life? Does not the feeling of the psalmist again steal over us, as in the beginning of our lecture? With profound reverence we approach the altar of humanity. But this must not prevent us

from investigating with the sharp critical mind which the passing centuries have given us what we reverently worship. One thing must be avoided if we would not stumble: the mixing of our wishes and our judgment, the intermingling of feelings produced by our sense of the sublime and the magnificent, with the results of judicious and painstaking investigation. It has been in this spirit that the various phases of the great subject have been treated in this course of lectures; and as scientific students we need not despair of the final solution of many of the great problems of universal history. May we not press forward with the battle-cry of the greatest of all German humanists: *Perrumpendum est tandem! Perrumpendum est!*

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

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